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JUDICIAL CHARACTER (AND DOES IT
MATTER)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION. H. Jefferson
Powell. 1 University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. x + 149.
$22.50 (cloth).
HOW JUDGES THINK. Richard A. Posner." Harvard
University Press. 2008. Pp. 387. $29.95.
JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Daniel A. Farbee & Suzanna
Sherry. 4 Oxford University Press. 2009. Pp. xv + 201. $29.95
(cloth).
Paul Horwitz'
I. INTRODUCTION

The three works under review in this Essay cover a wide
variety of approaches to thinking about and describing the task
of judging, in its ideal and not-so-ideal states. Even so, they
reflect only a sliver of a vibrant and burgeoning academic
literature analyzing and assessing the nature of the judicial

1. Professor of Law. Duke University.
2. Circuit Judge. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: and
Senior Lecturer. University of Chicago Law SchooL
3. Sho Sato Professor of Law. University of California. Berkeley.
4. Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law. Vanderbilt Universitv.
5. Associate Professor. University of Alabama School of Law. I a~ grateful to the
John Marshall Law School in Atlanta and the Prawfsfest conference hosted by Florida
State University College of Law for comments received on a presentation of an early
draft of this paper. and to Bill Araiza. Marc DeGirolami. Michael Dimino. Dave
Fagundes. Brian Galle. Andy Hessick. Carissa Hessick. Rob Kar. Erik Knutsen. Zak
Kramer. Dan Markel. Chad Oldfather. and Lesley Wexler for comments. Thank you to
Jennifer Michaelis and Martha Rogers for valuable research assistance and Kelly
Horwitz for support. The title of this Review Essay is inspired by Richard A. Posner.
Judges· Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?). 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995).
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function." The questions they ask, and even some of the answers
they provide, are hardly new; in many respects, we all stand in
the shadow of Benjamin Cardozo's grand work on this topic,
now approaching its ninetieth anniversary.' Thanks to
interdisciplinary work drawn from political science, psychology,
behavioral economics, and other fields, however, the work on
this subject has approached a new level of sophistication and a
fever pitch of interest. Today, more than at any period since the
first flush of legal realism, judges stand at the bar of judgment,
by their peers and themselves.R
Each of the books discussed here approaches the subject of
judging, and the question of what constitutes the proper nature
and role of judges, in a different spirit, whatever common
features they may happen to possess. H. Jefferson Powell's book,
Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial
Decision, offers what its title suggests: a moral account of
judging, focusing particularly on constitutional interpretation,
that describes the ideal judge in terms of the virtues that should
be embodied in his or her work.
In How Judges Think, Judge Richard Posner, who figures as
a foil in Powell's book (Powell3-6, 9-10, 91, 107), provides a far
less idealistic account of judging, one that is based substantially
on empirical studies of the judicial task and that describes judges
rather less romantically as being driven by the incentives of a
highly specialized job market. Although Posner too has a judicial
method to offer-pragmatism-it is not nearly as romantic a
vision of judging as Powell's, and the book on the whole is a
typical Posnerian soak in the acid bath.

6. For one among many examples. see Symposium. Measuring Judges and Justice.
58 DUKE L.J. 1173-1823 (2009). For a superb syllabus for a course on judging and the
judicial process that collects many relevant sources. see Chad M. Oldfather. Course
Materials for a Seminar on Judging and the Judicial Process. Marquette University Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Research Paper No. 08-28 (Nov. 2008).
available at http://ssm.cornlabstract=1297423.
7. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
Charles Clark and David Trubek noted the fortieth anniversary of Cardozo's book by
observing that a then-contemporary "strange recrudescence in legal literature of the
thesis that judges must find or restate. and not make. law suggests that every generation
must rediscover these truths for itself." Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek. The
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition. 71
YALE L.J. 255 (1961).
8. Cf ANTHONY T. KRONMAN. THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (1995) ("In the past it was enough simply to praise a lawyer for
possessing good judgment. without inquiring too deeply into the nature of this complex
power. That is no longer true.").
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Finally, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, in Judgment
Calls: Principle and Politics in Constitutional Law, attempt to
split the difference between Posner and Powell. Like Posner,
they offer an account of judging, again focused on the Supreme
Court's role as constitutional interpreter, that draws, albeit
lightly, on empirical work on the judicial role and promotes a
pragmatic approach to judging. Like Powell, however, there is a
distinct air of idealism to their conclusions, and they too draw on
a list of virtues that they argue should characterize the work of
the courts.
What all these disparate visions of the judicial role arguably
have in common is a focus on what I will call the role of judicial
character. How to define judicial character at all, let alone how
to define and spot good judicial character, is, of course, itself a
difficult question. ''Character" in a broad sense can mean
nothing more than the "assemblage of qualities that distinguish
one individual from another. .. ~ Whether there is such a thing as a
distinctly "judicial'' character even in this narrow sense can be
controversial. Posner, for example, suggests that "no general
analytic procedure distinguishes legal reasoning from other
practical reasoning," that judges by and large engage in
''ordinary, everyday reasoning" rather than something
distinctive (Posner 248). StilL even denying the distinctiveness of
judicial character can serve to put the question of character at
issue. In a sense, then, all theories about the nature of the
judicial role must begin by asking whether there is anything
special about judges and judging.
One way to begin to answer these questions is to draw on a
stronger conception of judicial character-a virtue-centered, or
"aretaic," approach to character. The aretaic approach does not
simply ask what (if anything) makes judges distinct but is
concerned instead with what makes good judges distinct. In this
sense, "[w]hen we speak of a moral virtue or an excellence of
character, the emphasis is not on mere distinctiveness or
personality, but on the combination of qualities that make an
individual the sort of ethically admirable person he is. " 10 In
various ways, that is the concern of each of these books:
identifying the character traits that distinguish the admirable,
excellent, or virtuous judge.

9. Marcia Homiak. Moral Character. in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(2007). available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-character.
10. !d.
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Happily, we have tools at hand that might help us to
consider this question in a more thoughtful and detailed way.
The revival of virtue ethics in philosophy has begun to make its
way into legal theory, and with it, we have seen a slowly
increasing interest in "a virtue-centered theory of judging-an
account of adjudication based on a theory of judicial
11
excellence."
This approach is not without its dangers or limitations.
Substantively, the kinds of virtues that such an inquiry usually
comes up with in considering the judicial role risk being so
abstract or bland as to deprive them of any meaningful guidance
and do not contribute anything we would not already have heard
in what Posner aptly calls "the loftiest Law Day rhetoric"
(Posner 1). Or the aretaic account may be treated as leading to a
thick view of what judicial character demands; the thicker the
account, however, the more likely it is to be controversial.
Descriptively, one has reason to worry about the value of an
aretaic approach if the judicial virtues, so identified, are simply
too unrealistic. A theory of judging, or of judicial excellence,
may be so unrooted from the actual practices and incentives of
judges that it becomes nearly mythic-a sort of Easter Bunny for
lawyers.
Of course. a virtue-centered account of judicial character
might be an ideal or benchmark rather than being assumed to
describe any particular judge. ~ But if this account is too
normative and not descriptive enough, and if it fails to capture
the actual moves made by judges and the reasons for their
moves, the gulf between "is" and "ought" will threaten to
13
capsize the project. Descriptions of even virtuous judging must
not fail to take into account what Frederick Schauer calls "the
14
inglorious determinants of judicial behavior."
1

11. Lawrence B. Solum. The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory. 70 BROOK. L.
REV. 475. 478 (2005): see generally VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence
Solum eds .. 2007).
12. See, e.g.. Kronman. supra note 8. at 5.
13. In a recent paper. Richard Fall on observes that "the general topic of existence.
nature. and efficacy of constitutional constraints has received little systematic exploration
by legal scholars:· owing largely to the normative focus of most constitutional theory.
Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Constitutional Constraints. 97 Stan. L. Rev. 975. 977 (2009): see
also Clark & Trubek. supra note 7. at 268 (arguing. against those who would "develop[] a
new mythology of the judicial process to replace the myth destroyed by the realists.'' that
any such vision "is a vision purchased at the price of omitting a crucial aspect of the
judicial process as it really is. The omission. we submit. is dangerous").
14. Frederick Schauer. Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior. 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000).

2009]

BOOK REVIEWS

101

In this Review Essay, I use the books under review,
supplemented by a dose of aretaic jurisprudence, to attempt to
thread the needle between the "is" and the "ought"- between
the worldly, post-realist, post-interdisciplinary view of the judge
that features in books like Posner's and, to a much lesser extent,
Farber and Sherry's, and the more idealistic vision of judicial
character represented in Powell's paean to "constitutional
conscience" (and, again to a lesser extent, in Farber and Sherry's
work).
I should acknowledge up front that this goal will remain at
least partly unfulfilled. There simply is a gap between what we
might want to believe about judging and the actual task of
judging. let alone the performance of that task. One may thus
leave this Essay with a sense of being caught between the
judicial world that one wishes existed and the one that actually
does exist. 1' StilL I will argue in this Essay that it is possible to
bridge the gap-a little. We can do so largely by taking the
accounts of the real world of judging as a given reality, and
working within the internal and external constraints on judges'
roles and motivations to find gaps and crevices in which a more
idealistic conception of judicial character might take root and
even thrive.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
introduction to the renewed empirical and theoretical interest in
judicial role and character, and summarizes some of the
dominant approaches to these subjects. Part II offers a
descriptive reading of what each of the authors of the books
under review contributes to these questions. Part III builds on
this descriptive account by offering a more critical assessment of
these books.
In Part IV, I ask whether it is possible to split the difference
among these books in a more detailed and thoughtful way, by
asking what virtue ethics might add to our understanding of
judicial character. In doing so, I also necessarily ask whether
judicial character actually matters. It will come as no surprise by
now to say that I conclude that it does. But how it matters is a
complicated question with many implications for a sound
understanding of the judicial role and judicial character.
15. Or. as I put it in a shorter review of the Posner and Powell books. "mv heart ...
lies substantially (although not entirely) with Powell." but "[m]y head is with Posner."
Paul Horwitz. 9 E'iGAGE: THE JOL"R'iAL OF THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S PRACTICE
GROCPS 143. 145. 146 (June 2008). http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubid.
1069/pub_detail.asp.
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Ultimately, the vision I offer involves a mix of the
descriptive and the normative. To say that judicial character
matters, and that it makes sense to think in terms of judicial
character and judicial virtue, is as much or more an "ought" than
an "is." I argue, however, that there may be ways to bridge the
distance a little between the two. One important vehicle for
doing so is a renewed focus on the judicial oath as a means of
understanding the role that judicial character might play in a
sound understanding of the judicial role. That approach might
itself seem romantic or quixotic: do judges really spend much
time pondering their oaths? I argue, however, that the oath
might be a means of using the internal and external constraints
on judging considered by Posner to bring us somewhat closer to
the conception of judicial virtue advanced by Powell.
I.

THEORIES OF JUDGING: A FIELD GUIDE

As Frank Cross has recently observed, the prevailing
approaches to understanding the judicial function often reduce
to two antagonists: "the legalist theory of formalist decisionmaking and the attitudinal theory of political decision-making.""'
In its strongest form, the legalist model is often identified with
formalist and, in the constitutional field, originalist judges like
Antonio Scalia and Clarence Thomas. But legalism encompasses
much besides this extreme version. Indeed, the legalist model is
perhaps the most familiar understanding of judges for a wide
range of lawyers, including strong formalists but extending to the
Legal Process model of judging that continues to have a strong
foothold in common professional understandings of the judicial
17
role.
16. Frank B. Cross. What Do Judges Want?. 87 TEX. L. REV. 183. 187 (2008). As
Cross notes. the strategic theory of judging. which is sometimes identified as a third
model of understanding the judicial process. can be viewed as "simply an approach to
studying how the legalist and attitudinal theories are best implemented." /d.
17. See, e.g .. William N. Eskridge. Jr .. & Philip P. Frickey. Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium. 108 HARV. L. REV. 26. 27 (1994) (arguing that the legal process school
commanded a majority of judges on the Supreme Court as it was constituted at the time).
In Posner's terms. Justice Breyer. who is counted on this view as a member of the Legal
Process school. would be identified as a pragmatist rather than a legalist (Posner 254).
Even if we agree with this description. both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
arguably count as legalists. and thus maintain the primacy of both legalism in general and
the Legal Process school in particular on the Supreme Court. See, e.g.. Akhil Reed Amar.
Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning. 122 HARV. L. REV. 145. 181-82 (2008)
(arguing that Roberts is influenced both by his education at Harvard Law School, the UrLegal Process law school. and by his clerkship for Henry Friendly. a Legal Processoriented judge): Eric R. Claeys. Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the
Rehnquist Court. 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791. 819 (2005) (predicting that Chief

BOOK REVIEWS

2009]

103

Posner describes legalism as the belief that "judicial
decisions are determined by the 'law.' conceived as a body of
preexisting rules found in canonical materials ... or derivable
from those materials by logical operations" (Posner 41 ). The
legalist's hope is that "a judicial decision [can] be determined by
a body of rules constituting the ·law' rather than by factors that
are personal to judges, in the sense of varying among them. such
as ideology. personality, and personal background" (Posner 41).
Thus, in the legalist universe, all judges are potentially the same.
all have the same task, and all are working from the same
materials in search of an elusive but non-mythical beast: the
1
"right answer" to a legal question. ' The belief in a single right
answer is not essential to legalism; not every legalist believes
that law lacks discretion. But the legalist does believe that there
are at least "good," ''better," or "best" answers, and that these
answers can be derived largely if not wholly from the legal
19
materials at hand.
Legalism is the prevailing mindset of the American lawyer.
even in a post-realist age. That mindset is inculcated almost from
the beginning of law school. It begins with the fundamental basis
for legal education. the casebook. These tomes, departing a little
from their Langdellian roots. often now contain the subtitle
"cases and materials."~ But no matter how many "materials" are
shoehorned into a casebook. the primary text remains the
judicial opinion, leavened in some courses with a diet of
statutory materials. 21 Although even the most traditionally
oriented law school features traces of the influence of Yale Law
School's Legal Realist challenge to the Langdellian tradition of
legal education. ~ so that classroom discussions may be salted
with occasional references to policy or interdisciplinary
materials. for most law students these discussions are a side
0

2

Justice Roberts will follow the Legal Process tradition).
18. See, e.g.. RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOL"SLY 279-90 (1977)
(claiming that even hard legal questions can yield one right answer).
19. Although they describe themselves as pragmatists rather than legalists. Farber
and Sherry's views of judging have a distinctly legalist cast. They argue that although
legal reasoning is not .. a purely objective exercise:· judges can ··responsibly exercise their
leeway in deciding hard cases .. in a way that .. makes it possible for the rule of law. rather
than lawless fiat. to operate in a world that lacks the comforting certaintv of
mathematical reasoning .. (Farber & Sherry ..j ).
'
·
20. See Clark Bvse. Fiftr Years of Legal Education. 71 IOWA L. REV. !Oh3. 10M
(1988).
21. See generally Russell L. Weaver. Langdel!"s Legacy: Li1·inR With the Case
.'vlethod. 36 YILL. L. REV. 517 (1991 ).
22. See LAL"RA KAL\!A:-;. LEGAL REA LIS\! Al YALE. !927-60 ( 198h).
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show. The main event is still learning legal rules and methods
from legal materials, primarily judicial opinions. Law students,
like judges. remain largely "uninterested professionally in the
social sciences. philosophy, or any other possible sources of
guidance for making policy judgments," because they believe
that task is secondary to the job of making "legal" judgments
(Posner 42).
From this acorn grows the judge, and judges especially are
likely to pay at least lip service to the legalist model. Although
Posner. after collecting a number of examples of judges speaking
in openly pragmatic terms about their work, suggests that
"[j]udges' writing on judging, as well as what they say in
interviews. . . . is striking for the infrequency of legalist
manifestos" (Posner 252), there is a problem of selection bias in
this conclusion, because the most thoughtful and reflective
judges are the most likely to write and talk about judging, and
their departures from the conventional legalist model are likely
to be all the more striking and memorable because they are
exceptional. Most judges are apt not to say much about their job
at all. and any law student or law professor who has sat through
an array of speeches or classroom appearances by visiting judges
is more likely to hear references to "reason" or "the rule of
2
law" ' than to the latest social science research. The standard
pronouncement of a judge, whether it is for public consumption
only or accurately reflects the judge's self-perception, is still
usually the kind of legalism that is reflected in "the loftiest Law
24
Day rhetoric. " (Posner 1 ). Indeed, although they argue for the
value of "transparency" in judging (Farber & Sherry 97-104).
Farber and Sherry warn against "[a ]ttributing a judge's decisions
to political motives" (Farber & Sherry 96) and argue that legal

23. For classic written examples. see Antonin Scalia. The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989): J. Harvie Wilkinson III. The Role of Reason in the
Rule of Law. 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779 (1989). For a recent example by a sitting judge. see
William H. Pryor Jr.. The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on Judicial Modesty. 60
FLA. L. REV. 1007. 1013 (2008) (asserting. against Posner's advocacy of judicial
pragmatism. that "l consider myself to be a formalist or what Judge Posner calls a
·legalist."') (citation omitted).
2-l. But see David F. Levi. The Autocrat of the Armchair. 58 DUKE L.J. 1791. 179596 (2009) (book review) ("[M]ost judges would vociferously deny that their decisions are
ever influenced in the slightest by ·political' or personal considerations. and [that] most
judges pretend that they are finding the law and not making it." that "most judges are
more than aware that they are ·making law .... [M]ost judges. particularly the very best
ones. are acutely aware of the potential of personal factors. including judicial philosophy.
life experience. and personality. to affect how judges approach and then decide legal
issues").
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academics should "proselytiz[ e for "the rule of law as an ideal"
(Farber & Sherry 130).
In contrast to the legalist model is the attitudinal model of
judging, which (with important variants) is the dominant model
2
of political science thinking about the judicial function. ' This
model, drawing on studies of datasets involving judicial
decisions, argues that judges can best be understood as "acting
purely on the basis of their policy preferences. '' 2h 1udges
appointed by Republican presidents are thus more likely to
favor "conservative" outcomes, all things being equal, and
judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to
favor "liberal" outcomes. although both purport to be deciding
the same case with the same legal materials (Posner 19-23 ).
Frank Cross observes that "[t]he evidence of an ideological,
attitudinal role in judicial decision making is now enormous. " 2,
Posner argues that "[t]he attidudinalists' traditional
preoccupation with politically charged cases decided by the
Supreme Court creates an exaggeration of the permeation of
American judging by politics" (Posner 27). But he points out
that "[a]ny amount of political judging challenges orthodox
conceptions of the judicial process, . . . and the attitudinalists
have shown that there is plenty at all levels of the American
judiciary" (Posner 28).
The strategic model of judging is a variant of the attitudinal
model. It argues that attitudinalism does not capture the array of
factors that will press on judges who wish to decide cases
according to their policy preferences. including the need to
account for the potential reaction of other judges, legislators.
and the public. (Posner 29). Judges thus ''do not simply do the
right thing as they see it." but instead "seek to have the right
thing triumph in their court's decision and, more important, in
public policy as a whole." which entails "think[ing] ahead to the
prospective consequences [of their votes] and choos[ing] the

25. Lawrence Baum argues that the .. strategic conception of judicial behavior is
now the closest thing to a conventional wisdom about judicial behavior. .. LA WRE:--:CE
BAUM. JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIEJ\CES: A PERSPECTIVE 0'-1 JL'DICIAL BEHAVIOR 7
(2006). Although it is not clear. Baum·s statement appears to be directed primarily
toward the field of political science. and I take his statement as most accurate if referring
to political scientists rather than legal academics. The attidudinalist model is still the
prevailing model in political science. if we count strategic models of judging as a more
nuanced subset of attitudinalism. See Cross. supra note 16. at 187.
26. Chad M. Oldfather. Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the
Problems of Institutional Design. 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125. 132 (2007).
27. Cross. supra note 16. at 188.
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course that does most to advance their goals in the long term. '' 2'
A strategic judge might thus forgo a vote for a particular result
that she favors on policy or ideological grounds. in order to
achieve the greatest likelihood of having her preferences win out
when all the necessarv factors and constituencies are
2
considered. " Strategic judges may even behave in a legalist
fashion. although for very different reasons: they may believe
that "the public expects them to act on a legal basis." and that "if
they act in accord with public expectations. the public will be
more willing to accept and comply with their decisions."'" In
short. the strategic judge is an attitudinalist who games the
system.
Although the legalist. attitudinalist. and strategic models
have been the dominant theories of the judicial function, that
may now be changing. Critics of these approaches argue that.
perhaps in order to provide the simplicity and predictability that
one properly values in a model. these theories neglect the
1
"messy and complex" character of human nature.' That judges
are human is no new insight, of course; Jerome Frank was
putting judges on the psychoanalyst's couch almost 80 years
2
ago.' The prevailing models, it is argued. pay insufficient
attention to this fact, instead treating judges as acting "without
emotion or self-interest in order to advance the general good."''
That assumption ignores a host of internal and external
incentives and constraints on judges· motivations and actions.
including. in addition to emotion and self-interest. bounded
rationality. the desire to please particular audiences. the hope of
promotion. the love of leisure, and the drive to reduce cognitive
dissonance between what judges do and how they perceive
themselves (Posner 31-39. 57-77).'~
For this reason, and because the interdisciplinary tools
available for understanding these incentives and behaviors
have grown much more sophisticated in recent years and
gradually found their way into the legal academy, legal
scholarship has witnessed a profusion of recent work focusing

28. BAC~I. supra note 25. at 6.
29. See id.
30. /d. at 7.
31. Oldfather. supra note 26. at 1-B.
32. JERO~IE FRANK. LAW AND THE MODER:" MIND ( 1930): see also Jerome Frank.
Are Judges Human.>. SOU. PA. L. REV.17 (1931).
33. BAL'~I. supra note 25. at 18.
34. See also Oldfather. supra note 26. at 133-34. 142-44.

2009]

BOOK REVIEWS

107

on both the "judicial mind"" and the institutional and other
external forces that may affect judges' decision-making process.
The primary tools of this analysis have been economic.'"
psychological, 17 and. falling between the two,'' behavioral
psychology or behavioral law and economics.'" This sort of
analysis focuses on two aspects of judicial decision-making: the
social and cognitive influences on judicial decisions, including
the suite of cognitive limitations that have become familiar to
readers of the literature on behavioral analysis of law. and the
set of internal or external incentives or factors that influence
judicial decisions. Scholars in this line consider what it is like
for the judge. as a human being-whether a rational and selfinterested one, or a cognitively bounded one- to do his or her
10
job.' By multiplying the factors involved in analyzing the
judicial function, they sacrifice some of the simplicity and
predictability offered by other models of the judicial process.
but gain considerable descriptive force.~
One last model complete~ this brief tour of the prevailing
models of the judicial process. That is the virtue-centered. or
aretaic, model of judging, which I discuss at length in Part IV.
This is the "account of adjudication based on a theory of
1

35. See, e.g .. Chris Guthrie. et al.. Inside the Judicial Mind. H6 COR:-IELL L. REV. 777
(2001 ): Jeffrey J. Rachlinski. et al.. Imide the Bankruptcv Judge's Mind. 86 B.U. L. REV.
1227 (2006).
36. See, e.g.. Richard A. Posner. What Do Judges and Justices Maximi~e? !The
Same Thing Everyone Else Does). 3 S. CT. Eco~. RE\'. 1 ( 1993).
37. See, e.g.. Dan Simon. A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making. 30
Rl'TGERS L.J. I (1998): Lawrence S. Wrightsman. Judicial Decision Making: Is
Psvchology Relevant? ( 1999).
38. See Posner 35 (discussing the overlapping nature of the economic and
psychological models of judging). What Posner. using some latitude. calls the
"sociological" model of judging "straddles" these two approaches (Posner 34-35).
39. See Oldfather. supra note 26. at 142-43: see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & Mitu
Gulati. How Do Judges Maximi~e:' !The Same Way Everrhodr Else Does-Boundedly):
Rules of Thumh in Securities Fraud Opinions. 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002): Paul Horwitz.
Free Speech as Risk Analvsis: Heuristics. Biases, and lnstitlllions in the First Amendment.
76 TE~IP. L. REV. 1 (2003).
40. Posner treats separately the "phenomenological theory of judicial behavior. ..
which "studies first-person consciousness-experience as it presents itself to the
conscious mind." so that we ask "what it feels like to make a judicial decision" (Posner
40). Posner distinguishes this from the psychological model. which studies "primarily the
unconscious processes of the human mind" (Posner 40). For present purposes. I group
the phenomenological and psychological theories of judging together. since both depart
from the more abstract and mechanical attitudinal model of judging and focus on the
complexities of judges as individual decision makers.
41. See Oldfather. supra note 26. at 144: see also id. at 144 n.104 ('"In theorvmaking. descriptive accuracy is purchased at a sacrifice of predictive power. ... ) ( quoti~g
RICHARD A. POS'<ER. FRO~TIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 263 (20()] )).
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judicial excellence. ''~ It focuses on the desirability of judges
possessing '"the judicial virtues-courage, temperance, judicial
temperament. intelligence, and practical wisdom."~' As we will
see, both Powell and Farber and Sherry draw heavily on this
model. Its usual sources are philosophical in nature. relying in
particular on Aristotelian models of virtue:w There is some
room, however. for more empirically based virtue-oriented
theories of judging. Lynn Stout, for instance, draws on the
social science literature to argue that judges, for a variety of
reasons, may act as altruists, who "care not just about costs
and benefits to themselves but also about costs and benefits to
others, including perhaps such abstract 'others' as the rule of
law. or ideals of proper judicial conduct.,~, This is an
important possibility. It suggests that virtue-centered models
of judging need not be wholly aspirational, that they need not
be simply idealized benchmarks for evaluating judicial
character that bear no resemblance to the work done by
judges on the ground. It means that, if we can find and
encourage or exploit factors that might tend to push judges
toward a virtuous model of judging. we might bridge the gap
between "is" and ''ought" a little.
2

II. THE JUDICIAL ''IS" AND "OUGHT": OF POSNER.
POWELL, AND FARBER AND SHERRY
This brief description of the dominant approaches to the
judicial function and their recent competitors should serve as a
suitable foundation for a consideration of the books under
review. In this Part, I consider each of these books in turn. This
section is intended to be simply a descriptive account of these
books. I will take up a more critical assessment of the books in
the next Part.
A. POSNER

How Judges Think begins bluntly and forthrightly with
the statement that although legalism places some constraints
on judges. '"its kingdom has shrunk and grayed to the point
42. Solum. supra note 11. at 478.
43. !d.
44. Besides Solum and others who self-identify as virtue jurisprudes. Kronman·s
work on the lawyer-statesman ideal also draws on Aristotle. See generally KRONMAS.
supra note 8.
45. Lynn A. Stout. Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs. 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605.
1610 (2002).
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where today it is largely limited to routine cases, and so a
great deal is permitted to judges. Just how much is permitted
and how they use their freedoms are the principle concerns of
this book" (Posner 1).
Posner argues that conventional views of judges. including
those held by many lawyers and even judges, are lacking in
reality. Among the guilty parties for this air of unreality are the
judges themselves, who "are cagey, even coy, in discussing what
they do" (Posner 2). Another reason for the opacity in the
judicial function is the difficulty of determining criteria for
evaluating whether an opinion is "good" or "bad." This leads to
the book's inquiry into "whether there are grounds for
confidence in the design of the [judicial] institution and in the
competence and integrity of the judges who operate it" (Posner
2). For Posner, this means studying the incentives driving
judges, "which may in turn depend on the judges' cognition and
psychology, on how persons are selected (including selfselected) to be judges, and on the terms and conditions of
judicial employment" (Posner 5).
Considering the nature of judicial employment is one of the
key moves in Posner's book. Judges, he writes. "are all-toohuman workers, responding as other workers do to the
conditions of the labor market in which they work" (Posner 7).
At the federal level, lifetime tenure, salary protections, and
looseness in the agency relationship make the judicial market
insensitive to many of the standard incentives of the
employment market. We must therefore look to other, less
conventional incentives. That includes both the desire for leisure
and the desire for public recognition (Posner 59-60). Judges may
also have or develop "a taste for being a good judge'' (Posner
60). That taste "requires conformity to the accepted norms of
judging" (Posner 61), which in turn suggests that they will often
abide by the standard legalist model of judging.
Often, but not always. Legalist tools quickly fall short in
deciding difficult cases. And that means that judges, particularly
appellate judges, "are occasional legislators" (Posner 81 ),
operating interstitially within the sometimes broad spaces left
open to them by the law and legal doctrine. 4"
46. Posner is here echoing Justice Holmes's statement that judges "do and must
legislate. but they can do so onlv interstitially: thev are confined from molar to molecular
motions." S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen. 244 U.s: 205: 221 (1917) (Holmes. J .. dissenting).
Whether Posner would emphasize the word ··only" in that sentence. or would emphasize
the word "must" instead. is a separate question.
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This leaves much to consider about the nature, scope, and
proper limits of judges' actions as occasional legislators. One
response might be to say that, within this open space, "judges are
[still] motivated by a desire to be thought, not least by
themselves. as ·good' judges" (Posner 88). But that "leaves the
matter too vague. For what is a 'good' judge exactly, especially
when he is legislating?" (Posner 88).
One piece of the answer that is perhaps more satisfactory is
to think of judging, whether in the open or closed spaces of the
law, as a practice. or a "game'' (Posner 91). The game of judging
involves not just legalism, but "rules of articulation, awareness of
boundaries and role. process values. a professional culture"
(Posner 91 ). In this sense, judges operate under some constraints
even when they decide cases within the area of discretion, albeit
imperfect constraints that only mark the outer limits of what is
acceptable.
Within these broad boundaries. Posner argues that a
number of sources may influence the judge as occasional
legislator. These sources include ideology, which Posner
describes not narrowly. in terms of partisan leanings, but
broadly. to include a range of personal factors and influences
(Posner 94). They also include emotion and other
"psychological variables," which themselves "play a large role
in ideological formation" (Posner 96). They also include "'good
judgment.' an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of
empathy. modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion. balance. a
recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of
reality, and common sense'' (Posner 117). To Posner, the fact
that virtually every lawyer, including the most formalist judges,
respects the value of good judgment is telling, because if the
law were purely a mechanical exercise, good judgment would
be neither necessary nor particularly admirable for judges
(Posner 117).
Judicial discretion may be further constrained by a variety
of other factors. some internal and some external to the act of
judging itself. Although there are some external constraints on
judges-including the selection process, the hope of promotion.
and (for lower court judges) the possibility of appellate reviewthese constraints offer only "capacious bounds" on judges
(Posner 157). Internal constraints on judging are both more
interesting and. perhaps. more promising. Some of them,
however. Posner sees as plainly insufficient, or at least far less
constraining than their fiercest advocates would admit. One such
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candidate is originalism. Reaching backwards to history, he says,
"actually enlarges a judge's legislative scope, and not only by
concealing that he is legislating" (Posner 103). It does so both
because the more ancient a historical source is, the more ripe it
is for manipulation, and because the text to which originalists or
textualists refer rarely states an interpretive rule in anything like
a clear fashion. Thus, originalism is "an example of bad faith in
Sartre's sense- bad faith as the denial of freedom to choose, and
7
so the shirking of personal responsibility" (Posner 104)!
Textualism, another "quintessentially legalist technique[ ]"
(Posner 192), fails both because it leads to absurd consequences
and imposes undue corrective costs on legislatures, and because,
to the extent it is based on the "autistic theory" that legislatures
lack a collective intent, it is "bad philosophy, bad psychology,
and bad law" (Posner 194).
Originalism and textualism are simply subsets of legalism,
however, and it is legalism that is Posner's true target here.
"[L]egalist techniques give judicial decision making an
appearance of intellectual rigor. But in many instances it is just
an appearance" (Posner 176). The problem is not so much that
legalism is useless, but that it is insufficient, incomplete, and
undeserving of the amount of faith placed in it by its strongest
champions. Some of its tools are not so much constraints as they
are endlessly contested occasions for debate about their
application. Take the debate over the value of rules versus
standards. Rules, Posner suggests, provide the appearance of
certainty, but because they proceed from incomplete
information, new facts will either render them inadequate or
honeycomb them with exceptions over time (Posner 176-78).
Standards are flexible and adaptive to new information, but of
course they will sometimes deprive individuals of the certainty
they need to make plans (Posner 179). In short, judges "typically
lack the information they would need in order to make an
objective choice between the two regimes," and perforce will be
influenced in their choice of a rule or a standard by a variety of
factors, including personal temperament (Posner 179).

47. See also Clark & Trubek. supra note 7. at 270--71 (explaining that judges
··naturally like to clothe their pronouncements in perdurable terms. This may often be
harmless: it is not. however. when it enables the judge to avoid the necessity of facing the
consequences of his own decisions''). For more on the relationship between faith and
law. see Marc 0. DeGirolami. Faith in the Rule of Law. 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 573
(2008).
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In a boxing match, the last one left standing is the winner.
So it is here. Having done his best to lay waste to the claims of
his competitors, Posner is left with his preferred approach to
judging: pragmatism. "The word that best describes the average
American judge at all levels of our judicial hierarchies and yields
the greatest insight into his behavior is 'pragmatist''' (Posner
230). For Posner, legal pragmatism means "basing a judicial
decision on the effects the decision is likely to have, rather than
on the language of a statute or a case, or more generally on a
preexisting rule'' (Posner 230; see also Posner 243).
These sorts of statements are mother's milk for those who
are generally sympathetic to legal pragmatism. But they will be
galling to others-especially the hard-core formalist or legalist,
who wonders whether "legal pragmatism" is simply a
contradiction in terms. Posner acknowledges the potential
criticisms of legal pragmatism: that it "lacks moral earnestness''
(Posner 250), that it exhibits "a casual attitude toward truth,
especially moral truth" (Posner 251), that it "allow[s), invite[s].
or even command[s] judges to decide cases however they want''
(Posner 252). Perhaps most forcefully. critics charge that legal
pragmatism is "empty," because "it does not weigh the
consequences of a decision or even specify which consequences
should be considered" (Posner 240).-lli
Posner is ultimately unpersuaded by these criticisms. This is
so partly for positive reasons: he believes that many of the moral
principles or ends that his critics say he does not provide are
already obvious, at least in the sense of being uncontroversial
consensus values in our society (Posner 24~1). But his defense
of pragmatism rests largely on negative reasons. He does not
think it "demonstrable that pragmatic adjudication is 'right'"
(Posner 249-50). Indeed, he acknowledges that legal pragmatism
''is not a machine for grinding out certifiably correct answers to
legal questions" (Posner 249). Instead. as the title of the primary

48. For illustrative criticisms of this sort. see Ronald Dworkin. Darwin's New
Bulldog. 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718. 1735 (1998) ("[M]oral pragmatism has seemed to
many critics an empty theory: it encourages forward-looking efforts in search of a future
it declines to describe."): Ronald Dworkin. Reply. 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 431. 433 (1997)
("[Posner's] brand of pragmatism is empty because it instructs lawyers to attend to facts
and consequences. which they already know they should. but does not tell them which
facts are important or which consequences matter. which is what they worry about."):
Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove. Can Pragmatism Be Radical 7 Richard Posner and
Legal Pragmatism. 113 YALE L.J. 687. 691 (2003) ("Posner's pragmatism offers little help
when it comes to evaluating and selecting ends. which is crucial for resolving legal and
policy disputes.").
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chapter in How Judges Think describing legal pragmatism
suggests, he thinks pragmatism has prevailed on American
courts as a descriptive matter, and is attractive as a normative
49
matter, because it is "inescapable." The other theories that he
assesses, primarily legalist theories, are no more or less likely to
50
be "ideological" or "political" than pragmatism itself. In short,
"[t]rying to banish pragmatism must fail because it cannot be
banished. The only effect of trying to banish it would be to make
judges even less candid than they are" (Posner 251). Indeed,
given the likelihood that ideological commitments, policy
considerations, and personal factors will figure heavily in judicial
decision making, no matter the method of interpretation being
employed by the judge, openly pragmatic adjudication may be
more restrained, or at least more candid, than legalist
adjudication."
Although Posner thus thinks that pragmatism is both
inescapable and normatively preferable, he cautions that legal
pragmatism should not be severed from some of the same
considerations that drive legalists. The "good pragmatist
judge . . . is not a shortsighted pragmatist. . . . But he is a
constrained pragmatist" (Posner 253). We have already seen that
Posner believes many external constraints on judges are only
loose constraints. But he would appear to have greater hope for
the internal constraints on judges, including pragmatist judges.
Those constraints include a consideration of the systemic
consequences of particular actions rather than simply engaging
in a search for the "right" result in each case (Posner 238-39),
and the need to conform to the "prevailing norms" of our society
(Posner 241). Perhaps most importantly, recall Posner's view
that judges wish to be thought of as "good" judges and will work
toward that end. This desire constrains the legal pragmatist
49. See Posner 230 ("Is Pragmatic Adjudication Inescapable?").
50. See e.g., Posner 251 ("[J]udges who want to curtail civil liberties have at hand
legalist tools as powerful as those used by civil libertarians .... Legalism won't resolve
such disputes.").
51. See Posner 252 ("Judges are less likely to be drunk with power if they realize
they are exercising discretion than if they think they are just a transmission belt for
decisions made elsewhere and so bear no responsibility for any ugly consequences of
those decisions.''): cf Dan Simon. Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look
Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology. 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097. 1100. 1138-39
(2002) (arguing that the cognitive influences on judges that lead them to arrive at "a
lopsided view of the case that provides stronger argumentative support than the legal
materials would otherwise provide" may be "exacerbated" by the view in the ''current
legal atmosphere" that closure. in the sense of a definite and constrained legal outcome
that is purportedly compelled by reason. "is broadly seen as a factor that enhances the
acceptability of the decision and promotes the institutional legitimacy of the court").
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against being an utterly loose cannon. 'The pragmatist judge
must play by the rules of the judicial game, just like other
judges" (Posner 253). Thus, even committed pragmatist judges
will still be considerably influenced in their work by legalist
. "
practtces.·Finally, given the focus of both Powell and Farber and
Sherry's book, and the focus of this Essay, special note must be
made of one area where Posner doubts that any method,
including legal pragmatism, is likely to prove especially
constraining on judges. That is constitutional law-particularly
at the Supreme Court level, where the constraints on judicial
discretion are still looser. He believes the members of the
Supreme Court, insofar as they are driven mainly by ''the
political consequences of their decisions," are by definition
pragmatists (Posner 269); but I doubt he would say they are
very good pragmatists. "The Court is awash in an ocean of
discretion," working with little meaningful guidance in difficult
cases from an "old and vague" Constitution (Posner 272). The
Supreme Court's primary diet in constitutional cases consists of
"cases that are at once politically contentious and legalistically
indeterminate," and its decisions are perforce political in
nature (Posner 293). 53 It is not enough in these circumstances to
say that a decision "won't write," precisely because the
indeterminacy of the Constitution and the malleability of the
legalist approach means that a wide range of opinions will
write. In any event, the structure of the Court, with its heavy
reliance on talented if callow law clerks, makes it unlikely that
this would happen:
[A] Supreme Court 1ustice- however questionable his
position in a particular case might seem to be-can, without
lifting a pen or touching the computer keyboard, but merely
by whistling for his law clerks, assure himself that he can
defend whatever position he wants to take with enough
professional panache to keep the critics at bay'' (Posner 286).

In these circumstances, Posner argues, the best we can
hope for from a Court that is more conscious about the
pragmatic basis for its decisions will be more careful
consideration of consequences and more modesty on the part
52. See Posner 246 ("Just as legal pragmatism incorporates economic analysis of
law as one of its methods. so. we must not forget. it incorporates legalism as another.").
53. See also Posner 312 ("A decision taking sides on a moral issue that divides the
public along approximately party lines and cannot be resolved by expert analysis. let
alone by conventional legal reasoning. is a political decision.'').
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of the Court. On the latter front. however, he argues that
''[j]udicial modesty is not the order of the day in the Supreme
Court" (Posner 290). On the former front, he argues that even
the Court's more openly pragmatist judges, like Justice Breyer,
are inconsistent in their pragmatism and short-sighted in their
consideration of consequences (Posner 324-42), and that their
narrow backgrounds and "cosseted" status make it less likely
that they will be adequate pragmatists and more likely that,
egos suitably inflated. they will become "moral vanguardist[s]''
4
like Justice Kennedy (Posner 306, 310)." He would like to see
the Court clip its own wings a little, but I doubt he thinks it is
likely to do so.
B. POWELL
At one point in How Judges Think, Posner cites, with
evident derision, a "purple passage" from Henry Hart's famous
Harvard Law Review Foreword discussing the role of the
Supreme Court:
[T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the
thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard
facts of its position in the structure of American institutions to
be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing
impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law."

This is a fitting jumping-off point to describe H. Jefferson
Powell's book Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension
of Judicial Decision, because it seems likely that Powell would
gladly adopt as his own just about any proposition that Posner
would view with disdain. Posner serves as a foil in Powell's book,
because Posner, according to Powell, believes that "a judge has
no kind of moral or even political duty to abide by constitutional
text" (Powell 4).'" This runs directly contrary to the argument

54. Of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Gon::ales ~·. Carhart. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). he
writes: ··What does it tell us about the commitment to legalism of the four most
conservative Justices of the Supreme Court that they should have joined such a wild
opinion?" (Posner 311 n.95).
55. Henry M. Hart. Jr.. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices. 73 HARV. L. REV. 84. 99 ( 1959) (quoted in Posner. 301 ).
56. He bases this on Posner's statement about the pragmatist judge's duty.
discussed above. to consider systemic consequences when making pragmatist decisions:
""The point is not that the judge has some kind of moral or even political duty to abide by
constitutional or statutory text. or by precedent: that would be formalism." Richard A.
Posner. Pragmarism Versus Purposivism in First Amendmenr Analvsis. 54 STAN. L. REV.
737. 739 (2002) (quoted in Powe114).
·
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Powell wants to develop over the course of his short but elegant
book.
Powell takes as his central text Chief Justice John
Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison concerning the
importance of the judicial oath in justifying judicial review.
Because the oath figures in the arguments I develop below, it is
worth quoting at length, just as Powell does:
Why otherwise does [the Constitution] direct the judges to
take an oath to support it?
This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their
conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it
on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the
knowing instruments. for violating what they swear to
support?
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is
completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this
subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as
according to the best of my abilities and understanding,
agreeably to the constitution of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution
forms no rule for his government? If it is closed upon him,
and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn

mockery.
To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a
.
57
cnme.

Marshall's invocation of the oath "has not fared well among
modern scholars, who argue that it begs the real question raised
by judicial disregard of a statute . . . , or even that the oath
requirement actually undercuts Marshall's overall reasoning"
(Powell 2). 5s But what matters here is that Marshall thought this
57. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. 179-80 (1803) (quoted in Powell12). As Powell notes. federal judges continue to take essentially the same oath. (Powell
123 n.2. citing 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006)).
58. For examples of this criticism, see ALEXANDER BICKEL THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRAI'CH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 7-10 (1962):
William W. Van Alstyne. A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison. 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. 2526. As Powell acknowledges (Powell 123 n.3). this argument stems back almost to the
date of the Marburv decision itself. See Eakin v. Raub. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 352 (Pa.
1825) (Gibson. J .. dissenting) (criticizing Marshall's invocation of the oath in defense of
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argument mattered. Why did the oath matter so much to
Marshall?
Powell's answer forms the core of his book: it matters
because
the practice of judicial review rests not only on the structural
features of the American Constitution that [Marshall]
emphasized earlier in his opinion ... but flows as well from
the judge's individual obligations as a moral actor. [Marshall]
perceived in the oath requirement a juxtaposition of the
judiciary's governmental role and the judge's personal
conscience, one that gives moral weight to the individual's
exercise of the power of judicial review that the community
has entrusted to him (Powell 2-3)

Thus, there is an irreducibly moral and individual
component to the judicial function in constitutional cases. Powell
asserts that "Chief Justice Marshall was right to believe that the
exercise of the power of judicial review presents profound moral
questions for those who wield it.'' (Powell 9). Any effort to
interpret the Constitution leaves the judge in a position to
exercise good or bad faith in his decision-making process. Once
that occurs, "we clearly have entered the realm of moral
obligation to which Marshall appealed in his discussion of the
judicial oath." (Powell 10). He writes:
Our actual practices of interpreting the Constitution
presuppose the existence of a moral dimension to those
practices: put another way, much of what we say and do in
constitutional interpretation is meaningless-a "solemn
mockery" indeed-if constitutional decision is in fact free of
the sort of moral commitment that Marshall invoked in his
opinion in Marbury (Powell 10).w

Powell offers two central premises for his book. The first is
that there are, in fact, bases for "moral or ethical evaluations'' of
constitutional law, although they may be fairly thin (Powell 6).
They include the possibility of good and bad faith that I noted
above. He takes this as a governing assumption of American law

judicial review on the grounds that "(t]he oath to support the constitution is not peculiar
to the judges. but is taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government. and is
designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man. than to bind the officer in
the discharge of his duty").
59. See also Powell 12 ("The moral circumstances of a judge asked to exercise the
power of judicial review involve considerations of constitutional structure and of what it
means to call a court's judgment a ·decision according to law· that are inextricably linked
with his or her moral choices.").
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and society, and says that, "[f]or anyone who sincerely disagrees
with it, I have nothing (in this work) to say." (Powell 7). His
second premise is that ''constitutional law's central function is to
provide a means of resolving political conflict that accepts the
inevitability and persistence of such conflict rather than the
possibility of consensus or even broad agreement on many
issues" (Powell 7). The means of resolving these conflicts are
simply the stuff of "our actual, traditional practices of
constitutional interpretation. A substantial divergence between
what constitutional decision makers say they are doing and what
they actually are or are perceived to be doing would undermine
in the long term the value of constitutional law to American
60
society" (Powell 9).
The remainder of the book rests on these premises. Powell
wants to argue that "[t]he key to understanding the moral
dimension of constitutional decision ... is the demand it places
on the conscience of the judge" (Powell 10). In each case, the
judge "can act in accordance with the language and ideals of our
traditional practices only by deciding in good faith, according to
her conscience" (Powell 11 ). Powell's concern is to "explore[ ]
what it means to have a good (or bad) conscience in
constitutional decision-making" (Powell 11 ). A host of virtues
are involved in good-faith constitutional decision making, and
the need for these "constitutional virtues ... is implicit in our
constitutional practices" (Powell 11 ). Sounding a note similar to
his invocation of Marshall's "solemn mockery" language, he
adds: "Without them, constitutional law as this society has
traditionally understood it and our language today still implies is
impossible'' (Powell11; see also Powell42).
A variety of interpretive practices are argued by their
adherents to eliminate precisely this sense of weighty moral
obligation, by removing any significant discretion-and thus any
particular need for good or bad faith-from the decision maker,
whose task is rendered mechanical and amoral. Powell, like
Posner, will have none of these arguments. Textualism will not
succeed as a response, both because it does not describe the
judges' actual practice and because the (generally
indeterminate) "constitutional text itself presupposes that its
interpreters will go outside the four corners of its language.''

60. Again. he invites anyone who disagrees with him on this premise to take his
business elsewhere. See id. (''[I]f this last assumption seems wrong or wildly implausible
to the reader. this book will not attempt to persuade him or her otherwise.").
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(Powell 44 ). Comprehensive theories of constitutional
interpretation, which seek "an intellectual technology ... that
can prevent judges from importing politics (or the wrong sort of
politics) into constitutional law." are also doomed. because none
of them is persuasively drawn from within the four corners of the
Constitution itself (Powell 46-47). No theory can "exclud[ e]
politics from constitutional law," which leaves us with only
"moral, not technical" means of "achieving fidelity to the rules
of the [judicial] game" (Powell 47). In short. constitutional
interpretation is ''intrinsically a moral activity." albeit one that
Powell sees as relying not on external moral criteria but on
moral criteria that are "internal to the game" of judging (Powell
52-53).
What are those criteria? Drawing on a number of what he
considers exemplars of moral judging-including. most
interestingly, a legal opinion written not by a Justice but by an
executive branch officiaL Amos Akerman. who served as
Ulysses S. Grant's Attorney General (Powell 56-79)- Powell
identifies several such criteria. These criteria do not reduce to an
algorithm that will spit out correct answers: rather, in the open
spaces, constitutional decision making must "be governed only
by conscience, by a dutiful attempt to resolve the conflict of
constitutional provisions. interests. and principles as seems most
proper to the decision maker" (Powell 79). It requires the
decision maker "to come to a moral conclusion that cannot be,
by definition, anything other than a question of degree" (Powell
79). Still, Powell thinks that the American constitutional system
does "generate a ... set of virtues[ ] that define and inform fair
play in constitutional decision-making" (Powell 82). Without
tying himself too strongly to the project of virtue ethics, Powell
raids its larder to outline some "habits of mind and will that our
practices demand we develop in order that the Constitution may
be interpreted" in a virtuous fashion (Powell 82-83).
Powell identifies the first constitutional virtue as "faith."
Faith follows from his view that the Constitution is an intelligible
document, not simply an excuse for the exercise of raw and
unconstrained
power: were
it
otherwise. "American
constitutional interpretation as socially understood [would be]
impossible" (Powell 85). Faith-or good faith-thus demands
"both an acceptance of the Constitution's intelligibility ... and
an undertaking to govern oneself as a constitutional actor in
accordance with the Constitution's intelligible meaning" (Powell
85).
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Although he believes the Constitution is intelligible, Powell
also acknowledges that it is ambiguous, and thus that its
interpretation is open to uncertainty (Powell 87). Accordingly.
"if constitutional interpretation is not to devolve into cynical
posturing" in the presence of this interpretive ambiguity,
constitutional decision makers "must display the constitutional
virtues of integrity and candor: integrity in coming to decision.
candor in the presentation of arguments that often can be said to
be only the interpreter's best judgment, not the text's
unmistakable bidding, on how to enforce the Constitution"
(Powell 88). Importantly. if controversially, Powell argues that
integrity, by demanding that judges, "as a matter of personal and
institutional morality, ... treat the Constitution not as a tool that
they can use to achieve whatever goals they choose on other
grounds. but itself as the ground for their decisions," precludes
the "instrumentalist view of law of the sort that Judge Posner
and others advocate'' (Powell 91). On this view, judicial integrity
is apparently anti-pragmatic.
Another constitutional virtue is humility. Humility, which is
not to be confused with timidity or self-doubt, is "the habit of
doubting that the Constitution resolves divisive political or social
issues as opposed to requiring them to be thrashed out through
the processes of ordinary, revisable politics" (Powell 93-94). It
leads to "a humble or limited conception of the role of the
Constitution. of the Supreme Court, and of one's own
constitutional convictions" (Powell 94 ).
Powell's next constitutional virtue, "the virtue of
acquiescence'' (Powell 99), seeks to find space in constitutional
decision making for the recognition of the wisdom of the ages
represented by stare decisis, without treating it as a straitjacket.
Acquiescence is "the disposition to accept the premises of
existing decisions even when they are not our own premises, to
accept that a question can be settled and ought to be taken as a
starting point for further constitutional thought, not as an
opportunity for endless reargument" (Powell 99). It requires
judges to see themselves as existing within a substantial
constitutional tradition, but cannot free them from the
obligation to make good-faith decisions for themselves; it is, he
writes, "the exercise of a moral obligation rather than obedience
to an invariant rule of decision" (Powell 99-100).
This completes the list of "Powellian" constitutional virtues.
Again, it is important to note that Powell sees them both as
centered in the individual virtues of constitutional decision
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makers (Powell 101 ), and essential to the system as a whole:
"Without those virtues as ideals, and as realities, to the extent
that is possible for fallible human beings, American
constitutionalism is a fraud" (Powell 100). These virtues are
necessarily and ineluctably moral in nature: "There is no escape,
not even for legal instrumentalists such as Judge Posner, from
individual moral responsibility in constitutional law" (Powell
107).
Powell concludes on a note that again sounds in the
inevitability and necessity of conscience and moral choice in the
exercise of constitutional decision-making authority. He writes:
Our constitutional practices ... assume, in both the language
we use and the authority we grant them, that constitutional
decisions can be made through a principled evaluation of
constitutional arguments-and not on the basis of the will, the
preferences or the extraconstitutional values of the decision
makers. Those practices can only make sense, therefore, if
such a mode of principled constitutional decision is possible.
The only possible locus for such a mode of decision lies in the
constitutional conscience of the decision maker, a conscience
shaped by the virtues that correspond to the basic
presuppositions of the Constitution (Powell 114 ).

C. FARBERANDSHERRY
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry's book. Judgment Calls:
Principle and Politics in Constitutional Law, requires less space
to summarize, and may suffer from the fate of the middle child
who receives less attention than her older or younger siblings.
This is a consequence of the fact that, in many respects,
Judgment Calls splits the difference between Posner and
Powell's books. Like How Judges Think, it draws (more lightly,
however) on various internal and external constraints on
judging. Also like Posner, it advocates a form of judicial
pragmatism. Like Constitutional Conscience, however, it offers a
somewhat romantic faith in the rule of law and the possibility of
something other than purely "political" constitutional decision
making, and attempts to provide a list of virtues that might guide
judges in this effort. Whether this approach succeeds in
mediating between the two extremes, or whether it is bound to
satisfy neither side in the debate, is a question I take up in Part
III. First, though, a brief summary is needed.
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In some ways, Judgment Calls could have been titled The
1
New "New Legal Process. ''" The book announces itself as a
defense of constitutional judicial review (Farber & Sherry ix-x.
3). but that defense employs values that are characteristic of the
2
Legal Process school." Unlike the Legal Process schooL
however. Farber and Sherry reject the Legal Process faith in the
notion that "reason will necessarily produce 'right answers' if
judges are sufficiently smart and sufficiently principled" (Farber
& Sherry ix-x). Decisions involving the ambiguities of the
Constitution "inevitably involve judgment calls, and reasonable
people will sometimes disagree about the best answers" (Farber
& Sherry ix-x). Like Posner and Powell, they believe that no
comprehensive theory of judicial review can dissolve this
problem; all of them share a "common inability to constrain
judicial decision-making" (Farber & Sherry 27)."' With Powell,
they conclude that no theory of constitutional interpretation can
"purg[ e] the exercise of judgment" (Farber & Sherry 29).
What does judicial review consist of. if constraining theories
of constitutional interpretation are ultimately unavailing? Is law
nothing more than politics, as the attitudinalists would have it?
Farber and Sherry deny this. Instead, they say.
Constitutional decisions can be judicial and principled (and
thus firmly rooted in the rule of law rather than in politics).
as well as judicious and pragmatic (and thus range beyond
the narrow confines of text and original intent). Good
constitutional adjudication should be neither the mechanical
application of formal rules nor the freewheeling exercise of
pure politics (Farber & Sherry 4).

This is not to say that constitutional decision-making is
purely objective. A host of factors, including judges'
backgrounds and political perspectives, may influence their
decision-making in the open spaces of discretion. Nor do they
reject any role for "creative statesmanship" in judging (Farber &

61. That title. alas. had already been taken by Nicholas Zeppos. See Nicholas S.
Zeppos. Justice Scalia's Textualism: The New "New Legal Process," 12 CARDOZO L.
REv.1597 (1991).
62. See, e.g .. Farber & Sherry ix-x:
Our major aim is to explain and defend the thesis that even in hard cases.
reasoned legal decisions are possible . . . . We believe ... that the reasoned
exercise of discretion is not an oxymoron. In this. we follow in the footsteps of
the old ·Jegal process· theorists of ihe 1950s.
63. See also Farber & Sherry 26-29: see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY. DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAI"'TY: THE MISGL"IDED QUEST FOR
CO"iSTITl'TIONAL FOl'NDA TIONS (2002).
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Sherry 6). But the discretion exercised by constitutional judges is
bounded by internal and external constraints. Those constraints
"make it possible for the rule of law. rather than lawless fiat. to
operate in a world that lacks the comforting certainty of
mathematical reasoning" (Farber & Sherry 6). They make it
possible to judge constitutional decisions on the basis of a
"standard of reasonableness." and to believe that this standard is
capable of being achieved (Farber & Sherry 4).
The middle section of Judgment Calls, before examining the
constraints on judges. attempts to identify criteria by which
sound judging can be identified in the absence of comprehensive
theories of constitutional law. These are fairly broad criteria. but
Farber and Sherry argue that nothing more constraining or
mechanical is possible: the inability to define solutions to hard
problems in uniform or perfectly predictable ways is "simply
part of the human condition" (Farber & Sherry 37).
At the same time. they argue that it is not enough simply
to say that judges exercise discretion and leave it at that. This is
how they characterize Posner's descrigtion of constitutional
decision making in the Supreme Court. In their view, this '"if
not the heavens, then the abyss' syndrome" is mistaken because
"it refuses to see the middle ground between complete
constraint and boundless leeway" in constitutional adjudication
(Farber & Sherry 39). It is wrong both because it does not fit
with judges' own perceptions of their work, in which they
believe they are working "'inside the law' for concepts and
values''"' (Farber & Sherry 39), and because simply referring to
judges as gap-fillers within the discretionary spaces "does not
provide enough of a basis for evaluating judicial decisions.··
(Farber & Sherry 39). They believe it is necessary to offer
guideposts that enable a "positive description of judging," one
that "offer[ s] both guidelines for judges who honor the rule of
law and criteria for evaluating judicial decision-making''
(Farber & Sherry 6).
Farber and Sherry point to several such criteria. The first,
drawing on administrative law models for the evaluation of
agency exercises of discretion (Farber & Sherry 40-42). is the
64. See Farber & Sherry 38 (quoting Posner's statement that the Court is swimming
in an "'ocean of discretion"').
65. As Frank Cross notes. Posner. in contrast. ··cautions against overreliance on
such internal perspectives:· Cross. supra note 16. at 184 n.6 (quoting Posner 2)
("Biographies are more reliable than autobiographies. and cats are not consulted on the
principles of feline psychology.··).
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need for "[r]easoned justifications, based on relevant factors"
(Farber & Sherry 43). Reasoned elaboration is, of course, one of
the hallmarks of Legal Process thinking."" In contrast to Posner,
they believe the requirement of reasoned elaboration provides a
useful psychological constraint on judges, who may find that a
decision "won't write" in a way that conforms with this
requirement (Farber & Sherry 44).
Because reasoned elaboration cannot be distilled into a set
of "clear and formulaic" limits, it must perforce involve the
exercise of judgment (Farber & Sherry 52). Farber and Sherry
acknowledge that judgment is a capacious concept, and one that
inspires unease among many legal scholars as a basis for
evaluating sound constitutional decision-making (Farber &
Sherry 55). I do not think this chapter will change the doubters'
minds. On the other hand, they argue, also correctly, that
judgment is a familiar, if difficult to define, term for American
lawyers and judges (Farber & Sherry 54).
What Farber and Sherry mean by judgment, precisely, is
difficult to discern, although they might argue that this is
inevitable. They argue that judgment involves knowing what
constitutes a reasonable or plausible legal argument in light of
··precedent. constitutional history, and public values" (Farber &
Sherry 55). "[M]ore than one reasonable outcome may exist" in
some cases, although. unlike Posner, they think such cases
constitute an "unusual event" rather than a "routine
phenomenon." (Farber & Sherry 55). Importantly, "[j]udgment
can be independent and objective," in the sense of "being
properly responsive to opposing evidence and arguments and
less likely to succumb to the various cognitive biases that can
negatively affect decision-making" (Farber & Sherry 56).
Drawing in fairly general terms on psychology, they argue that a
number of factors in the judicial environment, including judges'
accountability to unknown evaluators (unknown because a judge
cannot be certain which panel will review her decision),
heterogeneity in the pool of judges, and the development of
critical thinking skills, suggest that "judges are likely to be about
7
as good as possible ... at making reasoned legal judgments""
66. See, e.g. G. Edward White. The Evolwion of Reasoned Elaboration:
Jurispmdential Criticism and Social Change. 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973): see also NEIL
0CXBL'RY. PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-300 (1995).
67. See also Farber & Sherry 56-58. This chapter is. it should be noted. very thinly
sourced compared to. say. Posner's use of the psychological literature on judging. Farber
and Sherry rely almost entirely on a couple of sources discussing expert judgment in
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(Farber & Sherry 56). They conclude that the psychological
literature to some extent redeems the view that legal judgment
can be improved by careful attention to '"craft values' or
'professionalism'" in judging (Farber & Sherry 58).
In addition to these "intangible psychological factors,"
Farber and Sherry argue that several "internal and external
constraints on judges" also help to "keep them from lapsing into
arbitrariness or purely political decisions'' (Farber & Sherry 5859). The first is precedent. Like Powell, they believe that
precedent strengthens the integrity and legitimacy of the judicial
system by "transform[ing] the Court from an ever-changing
collection of individual judges to an institution, one which is
capable of building a continuing body of law rather than merely
a succession of one-time rulings" (Farber & Sherry 71). They
stress that respect for precedent not only adds to judicial
efficiency, but also reinforces humility, teaching us that "[i]t
would be arrogant to assume that we alone have access to
wisdom" (Farber & Sherry 70).
A second set of constraints arises from the structure of the
judicial process itself. That includes the tiered and multi-member
nature of the state and federal court systems, in which the
diversity of judicial personnel staffing the courts means that "the
only commonality" these judges will have "is their mutual faith
in the rule of law and their sworn oath to uphold it." and in
which they will "have to appeal to this shared vision" in order to
persuade their colleagues and have their decisions stick (Farber
& Sherry 89). The Supreme Court, which sits at the top of the
judicial hierarchy, may seem more loosely constrained by this
phenomenon, but Farber and Sherry argue that even Supreme
Court Justices must persuade each other. and must persuade

general. and neglect the growing literature suggesting that judges can in fact suffer from
significant cognitive biases. See. e.g.. supra note 39 (collecting sources). In the
bibliographical essay that follows the main text. they add: ""We would be remiss if we did
not mention that there is a substantial body of literature suggesting that judges suffer
from the same cognitive biases as most people. and are therefore no better at making
sound decisions·· (Farber & Sherry 188). They argue that this literature has been
··persuasively critiqued"" by Gregory Mitchell in a single article. See Gregorv Mitchell.
Why Law and Economics· Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behm·iora/ La11·
and Economics. 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (cited in Farber & Sherry 188). With respect. this
seems to me both an inadequate response to the literature on cognitive biases in judges.
and a curious one. since. as the title of his article suggests. Mitchell is arguing by
implication for the retention of rational actor models of decision making. which I should
think would be both equally unrealistic to Farber and Sherrv and normativelv
unattractive. to the extent that they are arguing for a non-instrument~! view of judging. ·
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lower court judges if they wish to avoid having their decisions
resisted (Farber & Sherry 89-90).
Another systemic constraint is the need to deliberate.
Deliberation not only improves decisions (Farber & Sherry 90)."''
but also implicates "the judge's own self-respect," and thus
serves as a constraint on arbitrary decisions (Farber & Sherry 90,
quotation marks and citation omitted). Interestingly for our
purposes. Farber and Sherry argue that deliberation is also a
means of '"shap[ing] the character of judges" (Farber & Sherry
91 ). It fosters a kind of "'judicial character" that is open to new
ideas and to criticism, that is both confident and humble at the
same time (Farber & Sherry 91 ). Still other structural constraints
exist, including even the presence of law clerks. which provides a
push-and-pull element in the judicial function that may "reduc[ e]
the likelihood of weak or unreasoned decisions.·· (Farber &
Sherry 94). More broadly, the trappings of legal pomp-the
robe. the bench. the genuflection of the courtroom audienceimpress upon the judges the seriousness of their role and
"'contribute[ ] to fostering adherence to the core principles of the
rule of law." (Farber & Sherry 94 ). Public scrutiny of judicial
opinions also assists in reinforcing judicial integrity. (Farber &
Sherry 94-96). Interestingly. however. Farber and Sherry argue
that the courts' professional critics should refrain from criticizing
judges for possessing political motives, because it may
"'incrementally persuade[ ] the public or the judges themselves
that law is abollt politics and therefore that we should expect
judges to be blatantly political. ""y (Farber & Sherry 96).
Another constraint. transparency. Farber and Sherry deem
"perhaps the least discussed but the most important'' constraint
on judges (Farber & Sherry 97). Like Powell, they describe the
transparency constraint as the demand that "[a] judge's written
opinions ... fairly reflect her actual reasoning'' (Farber & Sherry
97). It requires that judges both be honest with others about
their grounds for decision. and attempt to be sufficiently honest
with themselves about their grounds for decision. It is "both an
internal and an external constraint," because it subjects judges'
actual reasons to public scrutiny but also demands that they face
up to their own reasons (Farber & Sherry 98).
6R. 8111 see Posner 301--D7 (arguing that deliberation is largely non-existent on
multi-member courts and is unlikelv to count for much in the absence of shared premises.
which are less likely to be present .in .. political .. cases). Farber and Sherry acknowledge
this possibility and call it .. worrisome if true .. (Farber & Sherry 92).
69. See also Stout. s11pra note 45. at 1625 (making a similar argument).
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Farber and Sherry also believe that a series of internal
constraints helps to make sound reasoned judgment possible.
The most familiar and the most central is the presence of
professional norms in the law (Farber & Sherry 113-15). For the
most part, however, their discussion of internal constraints on
judging is more criticaL and they offer a series of suggested
structural reforms to buttress the internal constraints, by
enhancing judges' sense of judicial professionalism and integrity
and dissuading them from adopting a habit of thinking of law as
politics. For example, they suggest that the Court might hear
more cases, voluntarily or as a result of congressional expansion
of the Court's now effectively non-existent mandatory docket,
and that Justices might be required to ride circuit. Both
measures are intended to force the Court to consider more
routine and uncontroversial cases, and more non-constitutional
cases, thus encouraging them to adopt a habit of thinking in
apolitical and professional terms (Farber & Sherry 120).
Farber and Sherry close with a set of case studies that they
argue demonstrate the possibility of evaluating legal decisions
for their adherence to, or departure from, the standards they set
for reasoned legal judgment. To take one example, they argue
70
that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
is commendable because it makes the most open and "serious
effort to reconcile the [conflicting] interests" between liberty and
security that the Court confronted in that case (Farber & Sherry
137). It is not perfect, in their view, but it is ''admirable for its
principled stand against arbitrary arrests and for its effort to find
a solution that also respected our constitutional history and the
need for some flexibility in protecting national security" (Farber
& Sherry 137). They also treat the votes in that case as "evidence
that ideology is not everything. even in the hardest constitutional
cases" (Farber & Sherry 138).
Farber and Sherry conclude with a "perhaps deceptively
simple" prescription: "Respect precedent, exercise good
judgment, provide reasoned explanations, deliberate with your
colleagues, and keep in mind the possible responses of critics. In
our view, the first virtue of judges is prudence" (Farber & Sherry
167). But prudence is "not enough to make a great judge. For
that, vision is also required-not in the sense of a comprehensive
roadmap, but in an ability to sense the deep constitutional values
underlying a hard issue" (Farber & Sherry 167). They describe
70.

542

u.s. 507 (2004).
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constitutional decision-making as "a quest to temper politics
with law," and argue that "that quest is not quixotic" (Farber &
Sherry 168). They write, responding to their early critics and
perhaps anticipating others:
We envision a Court that respects precedent, seeks to
articulate constitutional values and reconcile them when they
conflict. and explains the reasons for its decisions clearly and
honestly. We do not believe that this is a utopian vision,
though it is utopian to expect it to be satisfied every day in
every case. We also reject the view, expressed by some who
have read our manuscript, that this is an inherently
ideological vision suitable only for the politically wishy-washy
(Farber & Sherry 168).

*****
This brings a perhaps overlong summary of these three
books to a close. We have seen that these books, despite areas of
overlapping consensus, ultimately represent three points on a
spectrum of views about judging and judicial character. Posner
would not deny the role played by judicial character, but neither
would he romanticize it; the character of judges, for him, can
best be seen as a mix of factors, including professionalism and
the wish to be viewed by their peers as professionals, but also
including factors of personal background and political ideology.
The best hope for sound judgment-sound in the sense of
contributing to sensible policy outcomes, taking into account
relevant systemic considerations-is a thoroughgoing. if (for
consequentialist reasons) constrained, brand of pragmatism.
Powell's is a far more idealistic vision. Like Mark Twain on
infant baptism. he believes in the possibility of a "constitutional
71
conscience" because he has seen it, in the legal interpreters he
views as paragons of sound constitutional decision making. But
he is less concerned, perhaps, with the possibility of the
constitutional virtues than he is with their necessity. Without
them. constitutional law is a sham and an impossibility. For
Powell, the very nature of constitutional law renders the practice
ineluctably moral in nature; judges can choose to exercise good
or bad faith in carrying out that moral purpose, but they cannot
avoid the moral element of that choice.

71. Twain. asked whether he believed in infant baptism. was said to have replied.
··Believe in it'? Hell. I've seen it done!"" See, e.g.. TOM QUIRK. MARK TWAIN AND
HUMAN NATURE 1 (2007).
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Farber and Sherry bring up the middle. Their vision of
constitutional judging is surely far more idealistic and romantic,
and in that sense far closer to Powell, than that of Posner. For if
Posner thinks "objective" or legalist judging is unlikely in the
most difficult common-law or statutory cases, he thinks it is all
the more exotic in constitutional law, the subject of Farber and
Sherry's book; and even here, as we have seen, Farber and
Sherry think "[j]udgment can be independent and objective"
(Farber & Sherry 56). Their Polonian list of the qualities that
comprise good judgment is far closer to Powell than to Posner,
and although they call themselves pragmatists, they reject the
kind of instrumentalism that Posner sees as all that we have left
when law is stripped of its illusions. But they resemble Posner in
their rejection of comprehensive theories that promise to
provide meaningful constraint in the face of an aged and
ambiguous Constitution, and in their attempt to draw on the
social sciences and on institutional factors to find means of
constraining the judicial function and staving off cognitive bias
and raw politics. Their heads are in the stars, but they have a
foot planted, albeit unsteadily, on the ground.
III. BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL "IS" AND "OUGHT": A
CRITICAL EVALUATION
All of these books share some common themes, and all of
them make valuable contributions to the debate over judicial
character and the judicial role. In this Part, however, I offer a
more critical assessment of these books. That assessment will in
turn help lay the foundation for a more constructive effort, in
Part IV, to find a via media in thinking about these issues, one
that is based explicitly on a combination of virtue jurisprudence
and the role of the judicial oath. To do so, I consider what the
books under review lack-what may strike their readers as
unsatisfying in their account of the real and the ideal worlds of
judging in general, and constitutional judging in particular.
As I will make clear, I find Powell's book, bracing as it is,
too airy in its account of judging, and I believe Farber and
Sherry's book shares this problem, notwithstanding its effort to
paint a more realistic picture of judging. Both books give a fine
account of the judicial "ought," as it were, but an insufficient
account of the judicial "is.'' Posner's book, on the other hand, is
largely persuasive in its account of judging as a lived reality. 7c
72.

But see Michael J. Gerhardt. How a Judge Thinks. 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185
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What is missing here, perhaps, is a sense of the "ought" that
might complement his description of the judicial "is.'' Largely
absent from Posner's book is the quality of idealism and moral
clarity that is the beating heart of Powell's book-although I
doubt that Posner would be especially disheartened by this
criticism. Still, there are aspects of How Judges Think that may
open a space for a more constructive and somewhat more
idealistic vision of judging. They may be mere traces, but, with
some supplementation, they may prove enough to build on.
Begin, then, with Powell and Constitutional Conscience.
That this is an intentionally idealistic account of constitutional
judging is apparent from the very first pages of Powell's book, in
which he rejects those who would embrace an ideological
explanation for constitutional judging because "it seems the
product of hard-bitten realism," and instead urges us to see the
constitutional tradition as one involving "the faithful
interpretation of a fundamental law that is this republic's chosen
means of self-governance" (Powell ix-x). He adds that the theme
of the book will be "[h]ow we can believe that to be so in the
face of all the evidence to the contrary" (Powell x).
Powell's insistence on focusing on the judicial "ought"
rather than the judicial "is" is equally apparent in his refusal to
engage with anyone who objects to some of the central, and
decidedly idealistic, premises of his book. Thus, in placing good
faith at the center of his account, he says brusquely that he has
"nothing ... to say" to any skeptics (Powell 7). Similarly, he
brushes off anyone who might doubt the destructive force of a
"substantial divergence between what constitutional decision
makers say they are doing and what they actually are or are
perceived to be doing." (Powell 9). And he offers a blunt
response to any argument that the judicial virtues he recounts
might not be as essential as all that, arguing that to ignore them
would make "constitutional law as this society has traditionally
understood it and our language still implies . . . impossible"
(Powellll ).
Powell is commendably clear about the idealistic premises
of his book. But although he would evidently view too much
cynicism about the judicial process as corrosive of the
constitutional enterprise, I think it is rather his idealism that
proves corrosive, or at least tends to diminish the value of this
(2009) (disagreeing with Posner's explanation of judging): Levi. supra note 24 (disputing
Posner's descriptive account of judging).
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work. I agree with Powell that there is an irreducible moral
component to the act of judging. But to say this is not to say that
judging that falls short of Powell's high standards, or even that
rejects some of his key premises, will not be recognizable as
judging or will destroy the constitutional project. We live in such
a world, and however disenchanted Powell may be by it, it
continues to turn. Moreover. to construct a thin account of
judicial virtue without a thicker account of the real world of
judging, and the actual and inglorious determinants of judicial
behavior, risks leaving us with a very thin broth indeed.
Let me take these complaints in order. Again, as we have
seen, Powell builds his foundation on certain premises about the
necessity of good faith and integrity, by which he means that
there should be no disjunction between what judges do and what
they say they are doing. and offers the back of his hand to
anyone who disagrees. He derides the ideological view of
judging as, in essence, being attractive only to the sort of
sophomoric person who sees it as "the product of hard-bitten
realism" (Powell ix). He does not name Posner here, but it is
evident he has him in mind. And he suggests that attitudinal
views like those that have "many adherents in political science
departments, and not a few (usually unacknowledged) within
law faculties," are "a recipe for personal moral catastrophe"
(Powell 51). What he does not do is engage with these views, let
alone refute them. As Posner's book demonstrates, there is an
ample literature that offers at least partial support to the
attitudinalist model of judging, and particularly constitutional
judging, which is less constrained than other areas of law. From
reading Powell's book, however, one would barely be aware of
the existence of this literature, except in a general sense that
something bad and misguided has happened somewhere in the
academic literature.
Powell is aware of this literature. of course. 73 But his
response is a normative one and not a descriptive one. It denies
that those conversations are worth having. More than that, it
suggests that to plunge too deeply into these discussions is to risk
73. Although he does not seem very happy about it. See H. Jefferson Powell, A
Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?. 58 DL'KE L.J. 1725. 1725 (2009):
When I do dip into [empirical works]. I often find them rather difficult or even
alien. both in style and in focus. I also find them frustrating: the empiricists
frequently appear to be battling a formalist straw man who believes that law can
be done by following rules that do not allow for discretion in their
interpretation or application. I do not know anyone who thinks that.
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halting the enterprise of constitutional law as we know it. It is an
"ought" response to an "is" question. Powell's answer to the
question of what judges actually do is like that of the religious
believer who thinks that God must exist because life without
God would be unthinkable. That is no kind of proof.
In any event, is the more "hard-bitten" conception of the
judicial role unthinkable? Does it really render constitutional
law as we know it impossible or meaningless? I very much doubt
it. It may leave constitutional law in a rather chastened and
disenchanted position. It may suggest that the most sweeping
and grand discussions that we have been accustomed to put in
terms of constitutional law are, to some extent, window dressing.
It may even render constitutional law "an exercise in hypocrisy"
(Powell ix), a prospect that Powell dreads, although he might
have remembered the old saw about hypocrisy being the tribute
that vice pays to virtue. But that does not render it impossible; it
simply re-describes what we have been up to over the last two
centuries in less romantic terms. Indeed, Powell's failure to
genuinely engage the attitudinalists, and others, such as Posner,
who have described constitutional judging as a "political''
exercise, leaves him in something of a bind. On the one hand, he
apparently finds something of value in the constitutional
enterprise as it has unfolded over time. On the other, if the
attitudinalists are right-and Powell never shows that they are
not-then this is simply what we have been doing all along.
Powell might respond that we have simply lost our way; that
the constitutional virtues exercised by men like Marshall and
Akerman have been lost somewhere along the journey. This
declinist view is apparent in his sympathetic treatment of the
possibility that the "effort to exclude politics from law by moral
effort" is "in an advanced stage of decay at present" (Powell 4950). This is a typical view in constitutional scholarship, which is a
field of nostalgists, who hearken back to some lost age- the
Marshall Court, the Warren Court, the Founding era-or some
individual beau ideal judge and sigh, "There were giants in those
days .... " 74 But it is mistaken. The giants were not so giant, and
in any event they hardly carried the whole enterprise on their
own shoulders; they worked with any number of partners whose
own talents were no greater or lesser than those of our present
74. Cf Bruce Ackerman. A Generation of Betrayal?. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519,
1528 (1997) (calling the present generation of political leaders a "generation of midgets."
in contrast to those "Americans who actually accomplished something very great indeed
in the annals of the Republic").
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constitutional interpreters. Quite apart from the serious question
whether Marshall is really an exemplar of good-faith judging,
one Marshall, or Akerman. does not a Golden Age make.
Unless Powell can show us that constitutional law. in practice,
was ever a completely morally serious enterprise-and he
neither can nor does do so-then we must conclude that
constitutional law has always survived as an enterprise despite
the possibility that judges have been influenced all along by their
political priors.
So there is a gap between the ··ought" that Powell urges and
the "is'' we have had all along. That might not be a fatal blow, if
we could become convinced that Powell's vision is possible in the
real world of judging. But that real world plays a vanishingly
small role in Powell's book. It is not just that he fails to seriously
engage with the attitudinalist model of judging: it is that he fails
to engage with almost any empirical or psychological insights
into judging. Missing almost entirely from Constitutional
Conscience is any descriptive account of how the work of judging
proceeds from day to day. Instead, we are given a fairly abstract
vision of judging, divorced from the realities of dockets,
caseloads, and so on. We are given judges, functioning in a more
7
or less monastic way, ' but no information about who appoints
them and why, or about the machinery that surrounds themespecially their law clerks, who, as Posner observes, may actually
be charged with the burden of doing all the reasoning that
Powell loads onto the judges' own shoulders alone. We are given
a discussion of judges' motivations that rests on a set of
archetypical characters (Powell 16-27), but no sense of the
welter of "inglorious determinants" that actually drive judges.
from the political to the personal to the institutional. We are told
to assume that "meaningful conversation" can take place among
judges (Powell 85), but we are told very little about whether it
does take place and whether it changes anyone's minds. In place
of a non-ideal reality-although it is difficult to charge this
reality with being non-ideal unless we have a realistic sense of
what is actually possible- we are given an ideal fantasy.'"

75. See Powell 49 (describing. with a mixture of criticism and wistfulness. Felix
Frankfurter's description of judges as being under an obligation to live and work
monastically).
76. Cf Powell 121 (acknowledging that the virtues he describes ··can be accused of
fantasy. a failure to see that the political enjoys priority in a much harsher sense than I
have conceded. that there is not and cannot be anything other than the agonistic struggle
of political preferences"").
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Of course, one might respond that this is the very point of
Powell's book: to give us an ideal sense of what judges should
aspire to. But no aspirational guide can be of much use unless it
is at least somewhat tied to the real forces that move and affect
77
judges. Untethered to a more well-grounded account of what
judging involves, Powell's account threatens to simply float
away.
Powell is aware of the dangers of too "ought"-focused an
account of constitutional virtue. He writes that "[a] line of moral
thought unable to shape decisively the moral practices to which
it is directed is of dubious value to anyone" (Powell 50). It is for
this reason that he supplies the list of constitutional virtues that
make up the latter part of his book. But I wonder whether he has
escaped the danger of vacuity that he warns of, for two reasons.
First, it is questionable that one can speak confidently of being
able to "shape decisively" the moral practices of judges unless
one has a far more accurate and realistic understanding of what
judges can actually achieve, given their limitations and
motivations and the institutional forces that surround them. To
do so is like describing the ideal swimmer without asking
whether the actual swimmer is chained to an anchor.
Second-and, as we shall see, this is a common attack on
any virtue-centered account of ethical practice- the actual
virtues Powell ascribes to the ideal judge are arguably too thin to
be called decisive. Even if we assume away all the real-world
influences on judges and rely only on Powell's moral account,
that account supplies very little by way of actual guidance.
Where Powell's account is thicker, it is also more
questionable. Like many theorists who want to make the fraught
move from a general sensibility to a more specific set of
substantive implications, Powell offers up a set of "substantive
commitments [that] correlate with the constitutional virtues"
(Powell 110). But those commitments are both too abstract and
too specific to be convincing or useful. At the abstract level,
injunctions about the "absence of orthodoxy" or the "priority of
the political'' are not terribly helpful decision guides (Powell
110-11). If, on the other hand, we treat these commitments in a
thicker fashion, we may wonder how they are related to Powell's

77. Cf Julia Annas. Virtue Ethics. in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL
THEORY S15 (David Copp ed .. 2006) ('"[A]n ethical theory is weakened if the best

contemporary science conflicts with its claims or makes it hard to see how they could be
true."").

2009]

BOOK REVIEWS

135

broader virtue-centered account. Do virtues such as integrity
and candor really tell us anything about whether government
can prescribe orthodoxy. or about whether "[t]he community of
those who count" under the Constitution includes gays and
lesbians for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment? (Powell
113). Or are those substantive commitments another thing
entirely. with little relation to any account of judging that centers
on the judicial agent and his or her virtues?
I must emphasize that I find much of Powell's idealized
account of constitutional virtue compelling, particularly his view
that judging contains an irreducible component of moral choice
and obligation. But his book demonstrates the dangers of
focusing too heavily on the judicial "'ought" without adequate
consideration of the judicial "is ... Powell may content himself by
asserting that he has nothing to say to those readers who
question whether his idealized account is too far-flung from lived
reality, and that any other approach would render
constitutionalism "a fraud" (Powell 100). But that move
excludes most sensible readers. in my view. and certainly anyone
who has been at all persuaded by the voluminous literature on
judging that I only touched on in Part I. Those who live in the
world of the judicial "is" may be moved by Powell's eloquence,
but that is not the same thing as being persuaded by it.
Farber and Sherry's Judgment Calls falls next on the
spectrum from judicial "ought" to ''is." It is neither as idealistic
as Powell's book nor as realistic as Posner's. Despite my
sympathies with its effort to split the difference between Posner
and Powell, however, I will argue here that its attempt is still
unconvincing. largely because it is resides too much in the world
of "ought" and not enough in the world of "is."
To be sure, Judgment Calls is far more aware of the actual
practices of judging. Although I have already suggested that its
use of the psychological and other literature on judging is thin,
certainly it is far more active in its use of these sources than
Powell's book is. although that is a low standard and Powell's
approach is less dependent on those kinds of arguments. Farber
and Sherry are explicit in acknowledging that "[j]udges do not
operate in a vacuum" (Farber & Sherry 4). and they offer a tally
of internal and external factors that may influence judges in their
work.
By straddling the line between a descriptive and a
normative account of judges. however. Farber and Sherry fail to
satisfy the demands of either approach. This is especially
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apparent in their defense of judicial review. Farber and Sherry
write that the judiciary is "a human institution, and so we ask
only whether the judiciary can do its job well enough to make
the enterprise worthwhile" (Farber & Sherry x). More clearly
stilL they write that critics of judicial review fall short because
they "fail to compare judicial review in a realistic way with its
alternatives. We cannot ask whether judicial review is desirable
without asking 'compared to what?'" (Farber & Sherry 13). But
they do not undertake a full-fledged comparative institutional
analysis. one that views each of the competing institutions in a
non-ideal fashion and balances the costs and benefits of giving
the primary interpretive role to any one of them. Adrian
Vermeule. by contrast, has undertaken just this sort of analysis,
and has argued that the judiciary may not be the institution best
suited to this task. 7s One need not agree with Vermeule 's
conclusions to conclude that a more vigorous defense of judicial
review is required, especially if that defense is going to be
situated in comparative institutional terms.
Given how firmly entrenched judicial review is in the
constitutional game as it is played today, Farber and Sherry's
book would be no weaker if they had bypassed this issue
altogether. So let us assume that the legitimacy of judicial review
is not at issue. The question, then, is whether Farber and
Sherry's account of constitutional judging, both in descriptive
and in normative terms. achieves its aims. They write that
judicial decisions can be evaluated on the basis of
"reasonableness." a catch-all phrase that takes into account
whether a decision acknowledges competing arguments, whether
it "articulate[s] plausible distinctions and intelligible standards,"
and so on (Farber & Sherry 4). They add: "This may seem like
an uncontroversial thesis-and it should be-but in fact we have
received remarkably sharp rejoinders from skeptics" (Farber &
Sherry 4).
Small wonder. Of course, Farber and Sherry's very point is
that constitutional decision-making involves judgment calls. But
putting "judgment" in such capacious terms as "the strength of
... legal reasoning" (Farber & Sherry 4) approaches circularity.
Constitutional judgments are legitimate if they are reasonable, if
they involve "the rule of law" rather than "lawless fiat" (Farber

7R See. e.g.. ADRIAI'i VERMEULE. JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
1:'-iSTITUTIO:\AL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006): ADRIAN VERMEULE.
LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASOI'i (2008).
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& Sherry 4). and we can tell if they are reasonable because they
display good judgment. It is not completely circular-they
certainly do not believe that any set of reasons falls within the
scope of "reasonable'' constitutional practice- but it is so
general as to be unhelpful. It does little to exclude any but the
most obvious departures from standard judicial practice. It does
not blunt Posner's charge that the Supreme Court swims in an
ocean of discretion; it merely suggests that this discretion is
lightly bounded by a set of acceptable rhetorical moves and
practices, a point that Posner would hardly contest.
Farber and Sherry think reasonableness does more than
this. They think it provides a serious constraining force on
judges, who may find that an opinion "just won't write" (Farber
& Sherry 44). More generally. they argue that judges don't
perceive themselves as exercising boundless discretion: "they
may feel that they are not reaching 'outside the law' for a
policy solution, but 'inside the law' for concepts and values"
(Farber & Sherry 39). There are three problems with this
response. First, it neglects the institutional world in which
judges operate, and particularly the ability of both judges and,
importantly, their law clerks to translate the vaguest intuitions
or policy sentiments into the language of judging.n That is why
Posner argues that judges might be more constrained if they
acknowledged the extent of their discretion. and drew in a
more explicit way on pragmatic considerations that ostensibly
lie "outside the law," rather than taking too seriously their own
urge to believe that they are acting "within the law." (Posner
252). Second, notwithstanding their occasional efforts to draw
on psychological research, Farber and Sherry here neglect the
point that judges may not be aware of the cognitive influences
that press them toward what they see as a "reasonable"
decision in spite of equally reasonable counter-arguments."'
Finally, even if reasonableness, as they describe it. acts as
something of a constraining force, it does not constrain very
much: it is a muu-muu, not a corset. At this level of generality,

79. See. e.g.. Oldfather. supra note 26. at 144 ("[G]iven the number of cases on [the
judge's] docket and the amount and nature of assistance provided by his law clerks. it
may not even be that we can meaningfully count on him to ·decide' some of the cases
before him at all."): Mark Tushnet. Constitutional Interpretation. Character. and
Experience. 72 B.U. L. REV. 747. 752 (1992) (making the now widely understood point
that "[b]ecause most opinions are now drafted by law clerks. the opinions may not
represent the work of the Justice making the decision").
80. See. e.g.. Simon. supra note 51. at 1112.
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the line between the "rule of law" and "lawless fiat" is hard to
percetve.
The loose nature of the constraints offered by Farber and
Sherry is evident in their discussion. We have already dealt with
the requirement of reasoned elaboration and the view that some
opinions "won't write." To take another instance. Farber and
Sherry. like PowelL write of the constraining force of
deliberation on collegial courts. But Posner, among others, has
questioned the role that collegial deliberation actually plays in
judicial decision-making. They write that "[t]here is some
evidence that deliberation among judges, especially on the
Supreme Court. is decreasing," and chalk some of this up to the
different forms that deliberation may take in an electronic age
(Farber & Sherry 92). It would be better. perhaps. to question
whether collegial deliberation has ever played that significant a
role." 1
Farber and Sherry also argue that transparency is another
important constraining factor on judges (Farber & Sherry 97104) But this discussion seems to conflate transparency with
2
candor." Whether judicial candor is really a necessary aspect of
judicial decision-making is a debatable point.'" At present.
suffice it to say that it is unclear that judges need be candid
about what they are doing, provided that they are transparent
about providing some set of reasons for their actions. As
Tushnet observes, because opinions are ·'a form of persuasive
writing" directed at an audience, "[w]hat moves the audience
need not be what moves the author. ,>4 Certainly.
notwithstanding their appeal to "the way judges themselves
perceive their work" (Farber & Sherry 39), it is not clear that
81. We might also note Clark and Trubek's observation. in criticizing Karl
Llewellyn for arguing that deliberation. among other .. checks and controls... can .. wash
out individual bias ... that Llewellyn's examples of great judges are. paradoxically ... just
those men who could and did influence a whole court to follow their views ... Clark &
Trubek. supra note 7. at 263. The same could be said of some of the Justices who serve as
exemplars for Farber and Sherry.
1-12. See. e.g.. Farber & Sherry 98:
Transparency is both an independent value and a necessary concomitant of the
other constraints we discuss in this book. If a judge is not candid about what she
is doing and why. then it is impossible to know whether she is being faithful to
precedent or to the principles of incrementalism.
83. See. e.g.. Scott Altman. Beyond Candor. 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990): Scott C.
Idleman. A Prudemial Theory of Judicial Candor. 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995): David L.
Shapiro. In Defense of Judicial Candor. 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987): Martin Shapiro.
Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y !55 (1994): Micah Schwartzman. Judicial
Sinceritr. 94 VA. L. REV. 9R7 (200R).
R4 .. Tushnt.!l. ~upra note 79. at 752-53.
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judges are actually candid to themselves about what they are
doing. We might wish for them to be- a point that tends to favor
Posner's arguments in favor of an open appeal to pragmatic
considerations rather than conventional rule-of-law values- but
that does not make the wish any less quixotic.
The looseness of the constraints Farber and Sherry offer is
finally evident in their case studies of particular fields of
constitutional law. It should be unsurprising that differences of
opinion arise when we get to particulars, and one should not
hold this fact against them too much. But the fact that the
conclusions reached by Farber and Sherry in each of the realms
they evaluate-cases involving terrorism, abortion, and
affirmative action-are either tendentious or. to use their
critics' phrase, "wishy-washy" (Farber & Sherry 168), tends to
suggest the difficulty of moving from general principles such as
"exercise good judgment'' or "provide reasoned explanations"
(Farber & Sherry 167) to actual constraints on constitutional
judgment itself. For example, Farber and Sherry attempt to
distinguish the Court's abortion jurisprudence from the
Lochnerx' line of cases by arguing that the Lochner-era Court
"conspicuously failed to connect its view of 'freedom of
contract' with constitutional traditions," and that its subsequent
decisions attempting to justify the original decision were "fitful
and hard to reconcile," whereas the Court in its abortion
jurisprudence ''has tried to accommodate opposing values
when it became clear that its ruling was deeply opposed"
(Farber & Sherry 50-51). Even if we accept that these sorts of
responses to public opinion represent acceptable judgment calls
rather than "lawless fiat." however, it would take a more
discerning eye than mine to show that the Lochner Court was
more untethered to constitutional tradition than the Roe or
Casey Courts. or that the post-Roe decisions of the Court have
been any less "fitful and hard to reconcile." Similar criticisms
could be made about the conclusions that Farber and Sherry
draw in each of their case studies. What this suggests is not that
the Court has or has not exercised good judgment in any of
these areas, but that the issues themselves rest on such
contested policy and ideological grounds that "reasonableness"
cannot point the way to one conclusion or another-that they
are "political" issues, in Posner's sense of the term. But that
suggests either that any decision in these kinds of areas, and in
R5.

Lochner v. New York. 19X U.S. 45 (1905).
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constitutional law more generally. will be closer to ''lawless
fiat" than "rule of law," or that any judgment, suitably dressed
up in constitutional language, might be said to be reasonablein which case "judgment calls" will be of very little help.
My point is not to lambaste a fine work for what it does not
accomplish rather than for what it does. It is that the flaws in this
work are intimately connected to an uneasy tension between the
judicial "is" and ''ought." Farber and Sherry want to argue that
there is no tension there: the virtues that they see as crucial to
the constitutional enterprise. that make "judgment calls"
legitimate and worthwhile, are immanent in the actual activity of
judging and offer meaningful restraints on that activity. As an
"is." however. this argument is too thin to be wholly convincing.
And as an "ought," it is only valuable if it is suitable to judges in
the real world and actually likely to constrain them. Judgment
Calls may fail to satisfy on either side of the line.
Indeed. in some respects, the effort to straddle the line
between is and ought in Judgment Calls makes it a book at war
with itself. This is especially clear in the tension between Farber
and Sherry's praise on the one hand for candor and
transparency, their disdain for those who believe that ''the
public ... cannot be trusted with various kinds of knowledge"
(Farber & Sherry 102). and their argument on the other hand
that critics of the Court should not attribute its decisions ''to
political motives," because "it incrementally persuades the
public or the judges themselves that the law is about politics and
therefore that we should expect judges to be blatantly political."
(Farber & Sherry 96). It is hard to see how the public, in Edenic
fashion. can be trusted with "various kinds of knowledge."
except for the crucial knowledge that some of the Court's most
thoughtful critics think its constitutional decisions are, at bottom.
political.'" In any event. Farber and Sherry then immediately
violate their own injunction by saying-and not without
7
reason- that Bush v. Gorl "betrayed all of the principles
discussed so far" (Farber & Sherry 110). They may be right.
although it is quite possible to construct a lawyerly defense of
even that decision.t>H But the tension in their views is a result of
86. See CARDOZO. supra note 7. at 167 ("There has been a certain lack of candor in
the discussion of the theme [of the non-legal influences on judges]. or rather perhaps in
the refusal to discuss it. as if judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder
that they are subject to human limitations.").
f/.7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
88. See. e.g.. Jonathan L. Entin. Equal Prorecrion. rhe Conscienrious Judge, and rhe
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the difficulty that Judgment Calls faces in trying to achieve both
a descriptive and a normative goal. I tend to think that the book
is ultimately best viewed as an "ought" book rather than an "is"
book, but it is not clear that it succeeds on either front.
Of the three books under review, How Judges Think is
most clearly an "is" book. Not for Posner are any rhapsodies to
the moral seriousness of judging or to the triumph of the rule of
law over lawless fiat. He will have no truck with "Law Day
rhetoric" (Posner 1) or "professional mystification" (Posner 3).
This is squarely a book about the "actual practices" of judges.
not their ideal practices (Posner 2). And this is a book that
draws not on moral theories, or somewhat vain hopes about the
constraining features of general principles such as candor or
humility, or warnings about the corruption of the
"constitutional enterprise." Instead, it draws heavily and richly
on empirical studies and social science literature. with a
completeness that would neither be possible in a book the size
of Judgment Calls nor. ultimately, especially complementary to
that book's underlying "ought"-centered motivations. With
barely restrained glee, Posner warns readers to "brace
themselves" for the use of tools and terms like "reversal
aversion," "Bayes's theorem," ''monopsony," ·'authoritarian
personality," and "agency costs.'' (Posner 11). Unlike Farber
and Sherry, who warn about studies of judging that depart from
judges' own purported mental image of their own work, Posner
is unapologetic about "discussing judicial thinking in a
vocabulary alien to most judges and lawyers. Judicial behavior
cannot be understood in the vocabulary that judges themselves
use, sometimes mischievously" (Posner 11 ). Although, as its
title suggests, How Judges Think takes an internal as well as an
external view of judging as an activity, it is a decidedly different
internal view than the one that is sometimes touched on by
Farber and Sherry, one that focuses on what judges actually
think at a subconscious level. why they think the way they do
and what motivations lead to these thoughts. rather than on
judges' surface level self-perceptions. Even Posner's spirited
defense of constrained judicial pragmatism, which might seem

2006 Presidential Election. 61 Mo. L. REV. 576 (2002) (arguing that there are reasonable.
but contestable. defenses of the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore): Richard L. Epstein.
"In such Manner as the Legislalllre Thereof May Direct": The Olllcome in Bush v. Gore
Defended. 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001) (defending the outcome on other legal
grounds): Nelson Lund. The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore. 23 CARDOZO L.
REV.l219 (2002) (defending the decision).
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to take on a more idealized view of how judges should behave,
begins at base with the argument that judges are already
actually constrained pragmatists.
As an "is" book, I find Posner's book largely compelling
and persuasive. As against Farber and Sherry, who attempt to
split the difference between idealized and actual judging
practices, it is a far more thorough and successful effort. As to
Powell's Constitutional Conscience, one should not so much
compare the two books as contrast them. They are close to
mirror opposites, and one may find each persuasive in its own
way-one as a description of what judges actually do and the
other as an account of what judges must do to make
constitutional judging a morally serious enterprise. For all that,
despite the deep emotional appeal of Powell's book, it is difficult
to escape the sense that Posner's book is more convincing; that,
like a cockroach after a nuclear holocaust, it will survive, ugly
perhaps but adaptive and nimble, long after its rival.
An ''is" argument cannot wholly vanquish an "ought"
sentiment however, although it can certainly inform and should
probably chasten those sentiments. So it seems to me that How
Judges Think cannot wholly undermine those who would like to
think about how judges ought to think, although it demonstrates
that any idealized account of the latter cannot persuade too
deeply if it is insufficiently attentive to the former. For one thing,
in some sense the two projects are simply different: they can
influence but not overcome each other. More deeply, however.
and despite what Powell writes (Powell 4, 9), I do not read
Posner as denying Powell's fundamental point that judging
contains an irreducible moral component. Although that is the
evident spirit of Powell's judgment of Posner's approach, what
he actually says about Posner is closer to the truth: that Posner
denies that a judge has a "moral or even political duty to abide
by constitutional text'' (Powell4) (emphasis added).
That may be right, although Posner would surely argue that
constitutional text is among the principal matters that judges in
constitutional cases must reckon with, if only for pragmatic
reasons. But as Powell's own account surely acknowledges.
constitutional text is only one part of the activity of
constitutional judging, leaving aside the matter of statutory or
common-law judging. It involves a rich variety of legal- and, I
would say along with Posner, extralegal-considerations besides
the text itself. In that wider realm. Posner, like both Powell and
Farber and Sherry, does not believe that any comprehensive
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theory or mechanism of judging can be reduced to an algorithm.
Although the kinds of considerations that Posner believes may
enter into the work of judges as occasional legislators center
around pragmatic considerations, those considerations do not
exclude, but rather necessarily must include, moral
considerations, although they might not be recognizable to
Powell as the kinds of moral considerations he thinks ought to
hold sway in the constitutional realm. To the extent that Posner
is arguing that judges cannot be fully constrained in their work
by any mechanical forces, he is perforce agreeing that judging
includes a moral component. That should be clear from his
invocation of Sartre's concept of bad faith, which he describes as
"the denial of freedom to choose, and so the shirking of personal
responsibility" (Posner 104). Posner's judge, too, cannot escape
the weight of moral choice, although Posner may think that a
suitably "moral" approach to judging should be more
instrumentalist than abstract.
In short, although Posner does a splendid job of describing
the actual and inglorious determinants of lived judicial reality, he
does not exclude the possibility of thinking about the judicial
role and judicial character in a more normative fashion. More
than that, to the extent that his denial of any absolutely
constraining theories of judicial interpretation is correct and the
judge is thrown back on her own judgment. however defined,
Posner's description of the judicial "is" provides very fertile
space for thinking anew, but now in a suitably informed fashion,
about the normative ideals judges should strive for. By focusing
so relentlessly on the "is," Posner may, somewhat paradoxically,
lay stronger foundations for thinking about the judicial "ought"
than either Powell or Farber and Sherry.
Furthermore, Posner provides some useful spaces in which a
normative theory of judging, but one that is grounded on a more
practical sense of what is possible for judges, might develop.
Recall that one of the "tastes" that Posner argues judges have
for the job, and that leads them to choose the judicial office over
more lucrative options, is "a taste for being a good judge"
(Posner 60). This taste Posner describes as being both "intrinsic"
and "validated and reinforced by a judge's reputation in the
judicial and the broader legal community, and sometimes in
other communities as well" (Posner 60). Thus, a judge with
average tastes wants "[t]o regard [himself] and be regarded by
others, especially [his] peers, as a good judge." (Posner 61 ). That
means, among other things, following the rules of the judicial
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game, as set out in the judicial oath and elsewhere (Posner 70).
Judges do not want to be thought of as ""politicians in robes,"
since that would deprive them of both the intrinsic satisfaction of
the job and the benefits of being regarded by others as a good
judge (Posner 61). Moreover. according to Posner. since judging
and its satisfactions are intimately connected to the exercise of
power, the good judge may be motivated by a sense of
responsibility and conscience (Posner 62).
This is, to be sure, close to Farber and Sherry's concern
with judicial self-perception. and in some ways to Powell's
more virtue-oriented account of judging. But it is a more
persuasive account. Unlike Farber and Sherry. Posner does not
treat judicial self-perception as accurate: unlike Powell, he
treats the judicial taste for being, and being regarded as, a good
judge as one among many psychological motivations rather
than as a moral demand, and he thus does not raise the stakes
of the judicial game to the breaking point. But Posner does
suggest that among the motivations that may drive judges, an
important one is the desire to be and be thought of as a "good"
judge, with all the demands on conscience that may make: and
he suggests that this desire may be shaped by the conventional
norms and expectations that surround judging. including the
norms derived from the judicial oath. In so doing. Posner gives
us room to think again about what judicial character is, what it
might demand, and how, in something other than the best of all
possible worlds, we might shape and constrain judicial
character in positive ways.
IV. JUDICIAL CHARACTER, JUDICIAL VIRTUE, AND
THE OATH: A (SOMEWHAT) ARETAIC PERSPECTIVE
We are left, then, with the following questions. How can we
adopt a vision of judging that is more realistic, more willing to
take into account the "inglorious determinants" of judicial
behavior rather than simply rejecting them, than Powell's vision?
What sort of normative vision can we use to fill in the gaps left
by Posner's largely descriptive account, without ignoring the
psychological and institutional influences on judging that he
brings to life? Can we, finally, thread the path between the
judicial "is" and the judicial "ought" in a way that builds on but
is richer and more convincing than the attempt offered by Farber
and Sherry? In some measure, I think we can.
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We might see our way clear to such a vision by beginning
with some important common ground among all three books.
We might begin by insisting, with Powell, on the irreducible and
ineluctable "presence of a moral dimension to the role of the
judge" (Powell 41),~ and with Posner on the ineliminable role of
a sense of personal responsibility and conscience in the typical
judge's motivations (Posner 62).
Similarly, and on this all three books are clearly in
agreement, we might accept the premise-a fighting premise, to
some, but one that will find many adherents in the legal academy
and even more in the judiciary- that no purportedly
comprehensive theory of constitutional (or legal) interpretation
can so perfectly constrain the judge as to render the gravity of
the moral choices entailed in judging inconsequential. Whatever
its theoretical merits, a formalist or originalist approach to
judging certainly cannot, in practice, eliminate the need for
practical judgment in particular decisions, nor can it eliminate
the specter of Sartrean bad faith that Posner describes.<)() In this
91
sense, Justice Scalia's phrase "faint-hearted originalist" is not
92
an epithet but a saving grace. Neither legalism, in the more
general sense of doctrinalism, nor pragmatism deny the moral
component to judging-a point that incidentally suggests that
the distinction urged by Powell between instrumentalist and
non-instrumentalist approaches to judging is not always as
important as it may seem. Whether a judge's discretion is
somewhat constrained or utterly unbounded, discretion there
must be. There will always be open spaces in judging. With them
come the obligation of moral choice and the need for practical
wisdom.
These premises redeem the promise I made early in this
Essay to show that judicial character matters. For, where
discretion cannot be eliminated and there is no perfect set of
decision rules for the person charged with the obligation to make
9

89. See also R. George Wright. Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional
Theories. 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141. 196 (2004) ("To decide a constitutional question is
inescapably a moral activity.").
90. This is true even if one adopts formalism for instrumental reasons. See Solum.
supra note 11. at 530 (arguing that even the institutionally grounded argument for
formalist judging made by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. see Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule. Interpretation and Institutions. 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003 ).
"requires the aretaic turn").
91. Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil. 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 849. 862. 864
(1989).
92. But see Randy E. Barnett. Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"
Originalism. 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006).
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judgments, we are perforce thrown back to the question of
character. That is so not because a focus on character will
necessarily provide a perfectly clear description of judicial
behavior, let alone a decision guide for judges in particular cases
that allows us to assess definitively the rightness or wrongness of
particular decisions. It is because, for all the difficult questions it
may leave to be addressed, character simply is an ineluctable
93
part of the judicial role. Because it cannot be avoided, it must
not be neglected.
Once we agree that character is an unavoidable part of the
judicial role and worthy of study in its own right and for its own
sake, we have taken what Larry Solum calls an "aretaic turn. ,<J.l
That is, we have moved away from "a myopic focus on either
moral rules or the calculation of consequences to a broader
vision of normativity that focuses on human excellence. " 95 The
aretaic turn in law is similar to the aretaic turn in contemporary
moral and ethical philosophy. In philosophy, the aretaic turn is
both a positive and a negative project. Negatively. what it entails
is a rejection of the two approaches to moral philosophy that
reigned more or less alone before virtue ethics entered the
scene: utilitarianism, with its focus on consequences, and
deontology, represented most strongly by Kant, with its focus on
rights and duties. Positively, virtue ethicists not only finds
significant problems with these approaches as a guide to ethical
conduct,96 but suggests a new approach to ethical theory, one
that is distinctly agent-centered and focused on questions of
character. Although Solum notes that legal theory for a long
time neglected the emergence of virtue ethics as a competitor to
utilitarian or deontological approaches to moral philosophy, the
tide has plainly shifted, and an increasing number of articles
applying virtue ethics across a range of legal problems suggest
that "[l]egal theory has begun, at least tentatively, to make the
aretaic turn.''<n
If the time lag between the flourishing of virtue ethics in
philosophy and its emergence in legal theory is unsurprising93. For observations along these lines. see. Tushnet. supra note 79 (arguing that
because constitutional theory cannot serve as a strong constraint on judges. we must look
to judges' character): see also id. at 763 ('"Analyzing character now makes more sense to
me than paying attention to theory.")
94. See Solum. supra note 11.
95. /d. at 495.
96. See,e.g.. G.E.M. Anscombe. Modern Moral Philosophy. 33 PHILOSOPHY 1
(1958).
97. Solum. supra note 11. at 495.
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legal scholarship is, after all, generally parasitic on the
developments of the prior generation of work in other
disciplines-neither should its eventual attraction to legal theory
be surprising. Just as, in philosophy, utilitarianism and
deontology were generally seen as being attractive because they
offered a sure-footed and detailed guide to proper action, a
claim that arguably has been undermined by the virtue ethicists,
so legal theory, and constitutional theory in particular, have
sought to find clear decision guides for judges-whether
methodological, as in formalism or originalism, or more abstract,
as in rights-based theories of judging and other recourses to
"principle" in judicial conduct, of which Dworkin is perhaps the
modern exemplar. But the one thing that the authors under
review agree on, and in this they are joined by many in legal and
constitutional theory, is that there is no "single 'decision
procedure for judging' -some rule that would guarantee the
correct outcome in every single case.""" The aretaic turn in
jurisprudence is thus similar in important respects to the aretaic
turn in moral philosophy. It involves both a negative project and
a positive project. Negatively, it rejects the view that some single
method, whether focused on outcomes or on abstract duties, can
provide a decision procedure for judging. Positively, it argues
that the failure of these competing approaches is best responded
to by focusing instead on the character of the agents charged
with making judicial decisions and attempting to evaluate the
judicial role by asking in the first place what constitutes a
"virtuous judge. ,w If we view the central questions of legal
theory in this agent-centered way, we can see that the ultimate
focus of each of the books under review is ultimately one of
judicial character, however divergent the approaches of those
books may seem at first.
Although this Essay is too short a space for a full
101
description of even virtue jurisprudence, let alone virtue ethics,
a few words about each are obviously appropriate. Begin with
101
virtue ethics. Although there are many potential versions of
9R !d. at 49H.
99. !d.
100. For their best explication. see the sources cited in note 11. KRONMAN. supra
note 8. offers a description of the ··lawyer-statesman·· ideal that owes much to virtue
ethics as well.
101. Among the sources on which I rely are ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE. ON VIRTUE
ETHICS (1999): ALISDAIR MAChTYRE. AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007): VIRTUE ETHICS
(Roger Crisp & Michael Slate eds .. !997): VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER
(Daniel Statman ed .. 1997): VIRTLE: NOMOS XXXIV (John W. Chapman & William A.
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virtue ethics, and not all of them are necessarily Aristotelian, 102
modern virtue ethics has often drawn heavily on Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics. As we have already seen, it draws on
Aristotelian ethics (and is often called "neo-Aristotelian" in
approach) in large measure to seek a way out of what it sees as
the flaws of the prevailing approaches to moral philosophy:
utilitarianism and deontology. In contrast to those approaches, it
argues that "the basic judgments in ethics" are not about either
consequences or duties, but "judgments about character. " 103 In
other words, rather than moving from a consideration of right or
wrong actions to a consideration of what constitutes virtue,
virtue ethics treats "the concept of virtue [as] explanatory prior
to that of right conduct."l()4 Virtue ethics claims, most centrally,
that "[a] right action is one that is in accordance with what a
virtuous person would do in the circumstances, and what makes
the action right is that it is what a person with a virtuous
character would do here. " 105
Central to this (very basic) account of virtue ethics are two
underlying principles. The first is the Aristotelian concept of
eudaimonia, which has been variously translated as "happiness,"
''flourishing," or "well-being." 100 The ethical project thus begins
teleologically, by treating human flourishing as the highest aim
toward which we can aspire and asking how we might achieve it.
The answer lies in the virtues. As Macintyre puts it, "The
virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will
enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of
107
which will frustrate his movement toward that telos." A life of
eudaimonia is simply "a life of activity in accord with the human
excellences (or virtues)." 10H The virtues are thus viewed as those
qualities that are "necessary conditions for, or ... constitutive
109
elements of, human flourishing and wellbeing." As one can
Galston eds .. 1992): Annas. supra note 77.
102. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 101. at 9-10.
103. Daniel Statman. Introduction to Virtue Ethics. in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note
101. at 1. 7 (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Statman. Introduction].
104. /d.: see also Gary Watson. On the Primacy of Character. in VIRTUE ETHICS.
supra note 101. at 56.
105. Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking. Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles 9 (2001)
(emphasis in original). In offering this description of virtue ethics, Oakley and Cocking
are drawing on the work of Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot. although most virtue
ethicists would agree with this basic premise.
106. See, e.g.. HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 9.
107. MACINTYRE. supra note 101. at 148.
108. Solum. supra note 11. at 497.
109. Statman. Introduction. supra note 103. at 8.
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imagine, what constitutes the list of virtues is a debatable point,
but it is certainly taken to include what we would commonly and
intuitively think of as belonging on such a list: qualities like
1111
"courage, temperance, good temper, and justice." They are the
111
virtues without which eudaimonia is unattainable.
The virtues are both "character traits'' and, more deeply,
112
"excellences of character. "
They involve not merely a
disposition to act in particular ways, but without particularly
virtuous reasons for doing so,m but actually acting virtuously and
for virtuous reasons. ~ Central to the ability to act soundly in
accordance with the virtues is a particular virtue, that of
phronesis, or practical wisdom: "the ability to reason correctly
11
about practical matters. " ' Although Aristotle exalts sophia, or
theoretical wisdom, for its concern with the "highest" thin~s, "
for the virtuous actor, phronesis is ''the overarching virtue." 17 It
is what "guid[es] us to what should be done in [givenJ situations,
and thus "always ensures right action and response. " 1 x Phronesis
is thus central to any account of the virtuous actor in the world,
such as a judge.
Even on this abbreviated account, we can see certain central
traits that might be said to characterize a virtue ethics approach.
It rejects the competing approaches to ethics characterized by
utilitarianism and deontology; indeed, it argues that these
"principled" approaches have failed to help us with practical
11
ethical problems. y Accordingly, it moves away from attempts to
find a clear set of "right" and "wrong" answers to ethical
problems and move from those to questions of character, and
instead treats the question of character as having primacy in
ethics. It focuses in particular on what constitutes virtuous
conduct in any given situation, by which it means that right
11

11

Solum. supra note II. at 497.
See. e.g.. Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 15.
HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 12.
See id. at 11.
See. e.g.. Robert B. Louden. On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics. in VIRTL:E
supra note 101. at 180. 182.
·
HliRSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 12.
See. e.g.. Edmund D. Pellegrino. Professing Medicine, Virllle Based Ethics. and
the Retrieval of Professionalism. in WORKISG VIRTL:E (Rebecca L. Walker & Philip J.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
11-t.
ETHICS.
115.
116.

Ivanhoe eds .. 2007) at 61. 77.
117. Jennifer Radden. Virrue Ethics as Professional Ethics: The Case of Psrchiatrv. in
WORKIC\IG VIRTL'E. supra note 116. at 113. 129:
.
.
118. /d.
119. See. e.g.. Ht.:RSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 40: Statman. Introduction. supra note
103. at 6: Watson. supra note 104. at 60.
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conduct is simply what any virtuous actor. blessed among other
things by a strong sense of practical wisdom, would do in the
circumstances. Although it may be objected that there is a note
of circularity in the virtue ethical approach, Hursthouse argues
that this is not true: virtue ethics "specifies [the virtuous agent]
in terms of the virtues, and then specifies these, not merely as
dispositions to right action. but as the character traits (which are
dispositions to feel and react as well as act in certain ways)
required for eudaimonia. ,ICI,
Virtue jurisprudence builds on virtue ethics in the realm of
legal theory. It is, Solum writes, "simply the translation of the
aretaic turn in moral theory to the context of lawmaking and
1 1
adjudication. " c Of particular relevance for our purposes, the
aretaic turn in jurisprudence does not begin with an ideal theory
of judicial interpretation, including an ideal theory of
constitutional interpretation, and then ask what judicial virtues
might ensure the achievement of that interpretive approach;
indeed, as we have seen, it begins by assuming that there is no
"single 'decision procedure for judging. ,,~:•c Instead, it takes
questions of judicial character, or virtue, as prior and primary.
"In response to the question of ideal theory-'How in principle
should judges decide the constitutional controversies that are
presented to them?' -a virtue-centered theory of judging gives
an aretaic answer-judges should decide constitutional cases in
1
accord with the judicial virtues. " ' ' It is "virtue-centered," not
"decision-centered.'' ~
Like virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence generates a list of
virtues from the telos of judging, asking "what makes for
excellence in constitutional adjudicators" given the basic aims
125
of judging, most centrally the achievement of justice. Those
virtues include such uncontroversial traits as temperance.
courage, and humility, 1c" virtues we have already seen at work
12

120. Rosalind Hursthouse. Virtue Theorv and Abortion. in YIRTl'E ETHICS. supra
note 101. at 227. 229.
121. Solum. supra note 11. at 498.
122. !d.
123. !d.
124. !d. at 501--02: cf KRO~MA!';. supra note 8. at 16 ( .. The ideal of the lawyer
statesman was an ideal of character. This meant that as one moved toward it. one became
not just an accomplished technician but a distinctive and estimable type of human
being-a person of practical wisdom ... ).
125. !d. at 502. Although Solum's account. and mine too. focuses on constitutional
judging. the same would be true if we focused on other areas of judging.
126. For a detailed examination of the role of humility in judging. see Brett Scharffs.
The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom. 32 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 127 (1998).
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in Powell and Farber and Sherry's books: they also, crucially,
include practical wisdom, '"the virtue that enables one to make
127
good choices in particular circumstances. " A judge imbued
with practical wisdom has thus "developed excellence in
knowing what goals to pursue in the particular case and
12
excellence in choosing the means to accomplish those goals. " s
And, just as virtue ethics also generates a list of vices in
contrast with the virtues, so virtue jurisprudence generates a
list of judicial vices: corruption, cowardice, bad temper, and so
J:'l)
on.
This is, again, an abbreviated account. And it is likely that
virtue jurisprudence will face some of the same criticisms that
have been raised against virtue ethics. L"' Perhaps the most
common objection to virtue ethics is what has been called the
131
"action-guiding objection. " This objection argues that virtue
ethics "lacks the capacity to yield suitably determinate action
132
guides." It does not, in short. tell us what to do in particular
circumstances, besides the unhelpful advice that we do what a
1
virtuous person would do. " And even if it offers us some useful
guidance-even it for example, we have before us an
uncontroversial model of a virtuous person- whatever guidance
it provides is uncodifiable. Similarly, a critic of virtue
jurisprudence might well make the standard faculty workshop
move on just about any subject: that whatever is true about
virtue jurisprudence is banal and unhelpful. '~
To this objection we might make two responses.m The first
is the common response to similar objections to virtue ethics: the
1

127. Solum. supra note II. at 510.
128. /d. For a thoughtful examination of the role of practical wisdom within judging.
see Brett G. Scharffs. The Characrer of Le!!,al Reasoning. 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733
(2004).

129. See. e.g .. Solum. supra note 11. at 503-06.
130. For a recent critical discussion of the use of virtue ethics in legal theory. see
Ekow N. Yankah. Virrue"s Domain. 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167. Yankah's criticisms are.
however. directed primarily at the use of virtue ethics in criminal law theory. and are less
pertinent to either a judge-centered approach to virtue jurisprudence in ·general or an
aretaic account of constitutional judging in particular.
131. David Solomon. /nremal Objecrions ro Virrue Erhics. in VIRTCE ETHICS. supra
note 101. at 164. 169.
132. /d.
133. For a strong statement to this effect. see Louden. supra note 114.
134. See, e.g.. HURSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 39: Watson. supra note 104. at 59.
135. A third possible response. which I set aside here. is that the criticism itself is
mistaken: that virtue ethics. and by extension virtue jurisprudence. does provide a useful
guide for right conduct. See. e.f!, .. HLRSTHOL.SE. supra note 101. at 36.
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··partners in crime," or tu quoque, response. 136 Just as the actionguiding objection to virtue ethics "places demands on [virtue
ethics] which neither deontological nor consequentialist
137
normative theories can satisfy," so similar objections to virtue
jurisprudence. whether grounded on Dworkinian principle or
legal formalism or some other general decision-oriented theory
of judging. suffer from similar frailties. They cannot supply a
strong set of codifiable rules that will guide us in making
particular decisions. This not only places those critiques in a
'"rhetorically awkward position" and shifts the burden to the
1
objectors. " It also reminds us of the centrality of character in
any reasonably accurate account of judging, and the extent to
which judicial character is simply an unavoidable feature of the
judicial role. thus making an aretaic approach all the more
attractive as a starting point.
The second response is a more positive one. It argues that
what critics of virtue jurisprudence see as bugs in the system are
actually features. It takes the position that, just as the search for
action-guiding rules in moral philosophy has failed. so any search
for an overarching set of rules to guide adjudication, and
particularly constitutional adjudication, is likewise bound to fail.
No rule-centered approach to constitutional judgment can
139
substitute a set of guiding principles that work in practice; none
of them can substitute for the "situation sense" that is required
in the act of judging, constitutional or otherwise. ~ We are better
off focusing on what a sound sense of judicial character requires
than we are hoping for a comprehensive action-guiding theory of
judicial and constitutional interpretation that almost certainly
will never arrive.
That the relative uncodifiability of an agent-centered.
aretaic approach to either moral philosophy or judging is. on this
1 0

136. Solomon. supra note 131. at 171.
137. /d.
138. /d.
LI'J. I emphasize the words .. in practice." Some legal academics may continue to
insist on the rightness of some particular method of constitutional or legal interpretation.
Although I think they are wrong. it suffices for now to note Posner's view that "there are
no consistent legalists ... in the judiciary. as distinct from the academy. where reality
does not constrain imagination" (Posner 48); see also KRONMAN. supra note 8. at 319
("[S]ince judges are neither constrained by the need to make money from their work nor
encouraged to turn their opinions in specific cases into academic theories. one might
expect them to place a higher value on practical wisdom than law teachers and
practitioners do ... ).
140. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
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view, treated as, well. a virtue of that approach, suggests
something about what I would argue are the limitations of virtue
jurisprudence and its dangerous temptations. On the view I have
offered here, virtue jurisprudence is not and should not be
treated as a decision guide in any thick sense. Aristotle famously
observed that ''the whole account of matters of conduct must be
given in outline and not precisely." and that "the account of
particular cases ... [does] not fall under any art or precept but
the agents themselves must in each case consider what is
appropriate to the occasion. '' ~ As such, although virtue
jurisprudence may help us in forming and framing an
understanding of the traits that should constitute any virtuous
judge, and may help us identify clear examples of judicial virtue
or vice, it will not offer a more exacting and precise guide to
right judicial conduct in particular cases. There is generally no
one right answer to the question what a virtuous person should
do in any given case.' 4' So it is with virtuous judging too.
So a virtue jurisprude should be comfortable with the fact
that virtue jurisprudence, constitutional or otherwise, is neither a
clear ex ante guide to right judicial methods. although it may tell
us something about what kinds of people we want on the
bench, 143 nor a terribly useful ex post basis for critiques of
particular judicial results. She should be comfortable with the
fact that virtue jurisprudence is a guide to the decision makers.
not the decisions. We should avoid the obvious temptation that
so frequently infects constitutional theorists. who, having erected
a fairly broad theory of sound judging. engage in (generally
unconvincing) efforts to show how that particular theory cashes
out precisely in a series of cases. ~ Perhaps the least persuasive
1

1

1

141. Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics 1104al-7 in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed .. 2001 ).
142. See Statman.lntroduction. supra note 103. at 13.
143. See, e.g.. Lawrence B. Solum. The Virlltes and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian
Guide to Judicial Selection. 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 ( 1988).
144. To take one example. consider Jed Rubenfeld's elegant theory of the role of
commitment. writtenness. and time in constitutionalism. and his less convincing effort to
build and apply an interpretive guide based on that theory. centered around the idea of
paradigm cases. I feel confident in saying that one can wholly embrace the first half of his
important project without feeling especially compelled to adopt the second half. See JED
Rt:BENFELD. FREEDOM AND TI\1E: A THEORY OF CO;o.~STITCTIO!\AL SELFGOVERNMENT (2001): JED RL:BE:-.iFELD. REVOU'TION BY JL'DICIARY: THE STRL'CTCRE
OF A'.1ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). See, e.g.. Erwin Chemerinsky. A Grand
Theory of Constitwional Law?. 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249. 1261 (2002) (book review)
(arguing that the paradigm case method. as presented in Freedom and Time. is "verv
sketchy"): Brannon P. Denning. Brother, Can You Paradigm?. 23 Co;o.~sT. COMMENT. 8i
(2006) (book review) (arguing that Rel'Ollllion by Judiciary does not solve these
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aspect of Farber and Sherry's Judgment Calls, I have argued, is
that book's effort to demonstrate the applicability of its
approach through a series of case studies involving abortion.
affirmative action, and the war on terror. We should take a
lesson from this about the limitations of virtue jurisprudence.
Similarly. virtue jurisprudence should avoid the urge to
advance too thick a set of conclusions about what a virtue
account of constitutional law requires: or. at the least. it should
recognize the unlikelihood that those conclusions will necessarily
be persuasive to fellow virtue jurisprudes, who may be more
attracted to the uncodifiability of the judicial virtues than to the
notion that they can result in a thick account of judicial
interpretation that ends up looking substantially like the action
guides offered by non-aretaic theories of legal interpretation.
Here, I regretfully part company with Larry Solum, who is surely
the leading writer on virtue jurisprudence. For those who would
insist on "a less abstract account of the aretaic approach to
constitutional interpretation," 1·" Solum offers a set of principles
"that give more shape and structure to the idea of constitutional
14
justice as lawfulness, " " and that he aptly labels ''aretaic
constitutional formalism. " 147 Thus, it turns out. in his view, that
virtuous constitutional judges must look, more or less in ranked
order, to precedent, plain meaning. constitutional structure,
original meaning, and a set of default rules favoring "settled
historical practice by the political branches. weighted by
duration, proximity to ratification, the soundness of the reasons
offered for the practice, and strength of consensus among the
14
political branches." "
Solum acknowledges that "there are many ways to
articulate an aretaic theory of constitutional interpretation that
realize the ideal of constitutional justice as lawfulness. " ~ So we
need not take him as offering the final word on what
constitutional virtue requires of judges. I. for one, am not willing
to follow him very far down the path he sets out. In my view,
constitutional virtue does not convincingly demand that the
virtuous judge be a formalist. Perhaps more controversially,
there is no reason to think that a virtuous judge cannot be
14

problems).
l.f5. Solum. supra note II. at 520.
l.f6. /d. at 521.
l.f7. /d. at 520.
l.f8. /d. at 521-22.
l.f9. /d. at 522.
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substantially similar in his or her conduct to the kind of
constrained pragmatist that Posner offers up as the preferable
judge in a non-ideal world. That may seem a strange conclusion,
since Posner's pragmatism seems to suggest the kind of
instrumentalism that an aretaic theory of judging might reject.
just as virtue ethics typically rejects utilitarianism as a moral
theory. But pragmatism strikes me as an approach that better
responds to and accounts for the myriad complexities of judging,
for which no action guide is possible: and its constrained nature,
which Posner is at pains to emphasize, suggests that it need not
be a free-for-all and, indeed. will be suitably hedged in by the
very questions of virtue and character that a sound virtue
jurisprudence places at the center of the judicial enterprise.
Contrary to both Solum and PowelL then. I think a virtuous
judge can indeed take into account instrumental considerations.
although he should do so in all the fullness of practical wisdom.
But that debate can perhaps wait for another day. For now. it is
enough to observe that virtue jurisprudence should avoid the
temptation to codify itself too precisely or offer too thick an
account of what it requires. To those who demand "a less
abstract account of the aretaic approach to constitutional
interpretation," the best answer may be. to paraphrase Rosalind
Hursthouse, "it depends on what you mean by abstract. " 1511 Or
perhaps we should simply acknowledge that virtue jurisprudence
cannot offer a clear fixed account of what judging requires in
particular cases, and see this as a virtue rather than a defect of
the aretaic approach. As Solum suggests. this response may
leave some unsatisfied readers in its wake. But it should be clear
that, while the aretaic turn may have many useful things to say
about the judicial role. and even some useful things to say about
how well or poorly particular cases instantiate them, the belief
that particular decisions can be evaluated in a comprehensive
fashion according to some overarching constraining theory of
constitutional interpretation ought to have been laid to rest by
now. Virtue jurisprudence ought not fret too much about
meeting its competitors head-on if they ultimately offer no
better guide to judicial decision making.
If it is the case that a virtue jurisprudence approach to the
judicial role, and to constitutional law in particular, is not and
should not be treated as an action guide or as providing an
especially detailed means of evaluating particular judicial
150.

See HL'RSTHOL'SE. supra note 101. at 3'1.
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opinions, then what value does this approach have, and why
pursue it? We have already seen one answer: that whether or not
virtue jurisprudence can provide these goods, it is far from clear
that any competing account of constitutional interpretation can
ultimately offer them either. Those approaches, too, fail to
provide meaningful action guides. All of them ultimately must
rely to some degree on questions of judicial character, and so it
is surely worthwhile to explore this question on its own terms,
putting the question of character first rather than treating it as
secondary. That leads to another answer. As Solum suggests, at
least a thin theory of judicial virtue is likely to result in a list
virtues that might "correspond to almost any theory of
constitutional interpretation. " 151 Thus, no matter what one's
normative interpretive starting point, there is likely to be not
only room for. but a necessity for, some attention to judicial
character and virtue. Again, recall Posner's observation that
even the most rigid legalists, whose theories would (if they
could) eliminate "judgment calls" from the judicial role.
continues to admire the "elusive faculty" of good judgment
(Posner 117).
Finally, we might respond that an aretaic approach to the
judicial role. whether in constitutional law or elsewhere. can be a
valuable supplement to or substitute for other approaches to
thinking about judging because it can help us thread a more
useful path between the descriptive and the normative, between
the real world of the judicial "is" and the more ideal world of the
judicial "ought." For an aretaic approach to judging, although it
builds from a model of virtue and compares actual decisions to
the decision that an ideally virtuous judge might make in
particular circumstances, is also an approach that can build on
the actual limited capacities of judges in the real world. Rather
than wait for the perfectly virtuous judge to emerge from over
the horizon like a sun god, it can and does ask questions of
immediate pertinence to the judges we actually have. As Solum
writes. ''When it comes to nonideal theory, virtue jurisprudence
offers a set of practical recommendations. ,Joe What virtue
jurisprudence offers is a useful and practical, but not utterly
disenchanted. way of thinking about how we might design our
judicial institutions and practices in light of both what we know
about non-ideal judges, and what we might hope for from ideally

151.
152.

Solum. supra note 11. at 499.
/d. at 49R.
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virtuous judges. In particular, it can ask two questions: What set
of institutional norms, practices, and constraints might help
constrain our Uudicial) vices? And what set of institutional
norms, practices, and constraints might help nourish our
Uudicial) virtues?
These questions might seem to be in some tension with what
readers would expect of a virtue-centered theory of judging,
particularly one that builds on Aristotelian theory. To concede
that we are concerned with building the best judges possible out
of non-ideal material, and that we will use specific rules or
practices to do so, may seem to move closer to an action guide
for judges, or might seem to deny from the start the possibility of
genuinely virtuous judging, in the Aristotelian sense of judging
in the right way and for the right reasons, not because of some
external set of constraints.
For a variety of reasons, I think such an objection would be
mistaken. Because one of those reasons arguably moves a step
away from Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, I have
called mine only a somewhat aretaic perspective on judging.
Perhaps that is somewhat misleading or unnecessary. given the
wide acknowledgement that virtue ethics need not necessarily be
1
Aristotelian in nature. " I simply want to emphasize that the
approach I offer here, while distinctly aretaic in nature, by no
means assumes the perfect virtue of the judges, human as they
are, who inevitably will be the ones actually charged with the
duty of decision.
First, then, virtue theory, while recognizing that much
depends on the practical wisdom of individual agents, and that
no codifiable set of rules or practices can determine in advance
the exercise of practical wisdom in judgment, does not scorn
helpful advice about how the virtuous agent should act. It does
believe that no rulebook of practical wisdom is possible, and that
no one can be a virtuous actor unless he or she has accumulated
a capacity for practical wisdom that can only come from time
1 4
and experience. ' But it also assumes that even imperfectly
virtuous people have some sense of what virtue requires. and
that when faced with a dilemma they can always also "seek
moral guidance from people [they] think are morally better than
[themselves]," either literally or by taking the actions of morally

153.
154.

See, e.g.. HURSTHOCSE. supra note 101, at 8-9.
See id. at 59-61.
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1

superior agents as models for future conduct. " So virtue ethics
assumes both the moral imperfection of most agents and the
possibil~~?' th.at the imperfect may seek .guidance ~rom the f!lore
perfect. · It IS but a short step from this to the VIew that virtue
ethics can accept guidance from a variety of sources, even a
(loosely) codified or written set of recommendations about
virtuous judicial conduct.
Second. virtue ethics by no means denies or neglects the
importance of institutions and institutional structures in helping
to form and constrain the virtuous actor. To the contrary. the
Nichomachean Ethics concludes with a preview of Aristotle ·s
Politics. asking what sort of society and what set of laws might
aid human flourishing, and thus virtue. by ensuring that men are
·'well trained and habituated" and "spend [their] time in worthy
occupations and neither willingly nor unwillingly do bad
1
actions. " " It asks, in short, what sort of society would best be
suited for human flourishing, and thus virtue.
What is true for society writ large is true for the institutions
within it. Particular institutions may have their own telos, and we
may ask of those institutions whether they can be structured in a
way that encourages or requires the actors within them to act
virtuously in accordance with those ends. This line of inquiry has
been the basis for an increased interest within virtue ethics in the
application of that theory to particular practices and
1
professions. ' '
Thus, Edmund Pellegrino argues that professions involve a
literal profession, "publicly and in ... codes and Oaths," to an
un-self-interested commitment to the goals of particular
professions. and that this "act of profession is at the moral center
1 9
of authentic professional ethics. " ' Jennifer Radden argues that
a number of virtues "have been seen as required across all
professional practices." and that particular "role-constituted

155. /d. at 35.
156. Cf W. Bradley Wendel. !Von/ega/ Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social
Norms in Professional Communities. 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955. 1972-73 (2001)
The ethic of honor . . . hold[s] up for admiration figures who are widely
accepted as persons of honor and say[s]. in effect. 'What that person does is
what vou should do as well.· An honor soc1etv therefore fosters an ongomg
process of introspection about the ideals to which the society aspires.
157. Aristotle. supra note 141. at 1180a15-17.
158. See generally WORKING VIRTlJE. supra note 116: Oakley & Cocking. supra note
105: see also Robert C Solomon. Corporate Roles. Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach to Business Ethics. in VIRT\JE ETHICS. supra note 101. at 205.
159. Pellegrino. supra note 116. at 62.
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moral virtues within [a given! practice setting" '"impose[ ] special
duties on its practitioners. ,t ' Although Radden thinks that, in
the long run, professionals come to inhabit their roles fully and
cannot simply feign the virtues pertinent to their profession,
particularly experience-based virtues like practical wisdom, at
the outset the professional may "enact" the professional role
"without an accompanying sense of authenticity or
identification. ,tnt Thus, although virtuous practice is the longterm goal, in the short run "[a ]dopting the conduct and/or
~irtues of the _ethicaltWrofessional] may have to precede feeling
hke a [professiOnal]." Similarly, Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, who agree with
Pellegrino that "the focus of virtue ethics on functions and ends
fits well with professional practice, which can readily be
regarded as having a teleological structure, "t"' argue for the
value of "regulative ideals" within particular professions, which
is to say the formulation and internalization of "a certain
conception of correctness or excellence" within a professional
role, such that the person who accepts it "conforms- or at least
does not conflict-with that standard."tM Because these
regulative ideals "operate as guiding background conditions on
our motivation, they can direct us to act appropriately or even
rightly, even when we do not consciously formulate them or aim
at them."t 6' So, for example, someone who has studied jazz piano
may "develop[ ] a conception of excellence in jazz piano," and
may subsequently "be guided by this conception of jazz
excellence" when playing, "without consciously formulating that
conception" as he plays.t~>~> Their account does not depend on the
codifiability of "the values that determine excellence in a certain
160. Radden. supra note 117. at 114. 11R.
161. /d. at 125.
162. /d.: see also John T. Noonan. Jr.. Educarion, Intelligence, and Character in
Judges. 71 MINN. L. REV. 1119. 1124 (1987) ("To do verv well at law .... one must be
socialized in the basic concepts and the professional ethics. After that. a powerful mind
will develop itself by professional endeavors.").
163. Oakley & Cocking. supra note I 05. at 3.
164. /d. at 25.: see also W. Bradkelv Wendel. Lmn-ers. Citizens, and the Internal
Point of View. 75 FORDHAM L. REV. J.nj_ 1477 (2006) .
[T]o participate in certain social practices entails accepting the authority of
regulative standards as guides to behavior. and accepting the legitimacy of
criticism based on those standards. These regulative standards are not arbitrarv.
but have their origin in some ultimate state of affairs or value that is the aim of
the social practice of which they are a part. Normativity is therefore explained
in teleological terms. with the norms governing a social practice being justified
in terms of the ends for which the practice is constituted.
165. Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 26.
166. /d.
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regulative ideaL" as long as those values can conceivably play
some sort of "guiding or 7governing role in the motivation and
1
behaviour" of the actor. " In short, as these examples suggest,
virtue ethics is perfectly compatible with the development of
some set of values, principles, or even formulated practices and
rules that, through a process of internalization, help constrain
vicious behavior and encourage virtuous behavior within a
particular activity. 1N<
Finally- and here is where I perhaps take a step away from
standard aretaic discussions-we must not neglect the role of
continence within our understanding of the virtues and virtuous
1 9
conduct. " The Nichomachean Ethics spends some time
investigating character traits-continence and incontinencethat are "not as blameworthy as the vices but not as
praiseworthy as the virtues. " 170 An incontinent (or akratic)
person "goes against reason as a result of" passion or emotion; a
continent, or enkratic, person "experiences a feeling that is
contrary to reason; but, unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance
with reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than
most people, he experiences passions that conflict with his
171
rational choice. " As Hursthouse relates, Aristotle contrasts the
continent character, "who, typically, knowing what she should
do, does it, contrary to her desires," with the fully virtuous
cha~~cter, "wh?, lJpically: kno""':ing_ what she shoul? do, does it,
desmng to do It." - In Anstotle s VIew, "the fully vutuous agent
is morally superior to the merely self-controlled one.'' 173
167. !d. at 27.
168. See also Fallon. supra note 13. at 6-7 (noting that the Constitution ··furnishes
standards of legally required and forbidden conduct."" or ··normative constitutional
constraints:· that ··take the form of constitutionally inspired experiences of obligation"")
(emphasis in original).
169. For useful discussions of this concept. see HL'RSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 9299. 103-04: Richard Kraut. Aristotle's Ethics. in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics: Statman. Introduction. supra
note 103. at 29-30: see also JONATHAN LEAR. ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO
U-;DERSTAND 174-86 (1998) (focusing on incontinence rather than continence).
170. Kraut. supra note 169.
171. /d.
172. HCRSTHOL:SE. supra note 101. at 92 (emphasis in original).
173. /d. at 93. Readers in virtue ethics will know that the distinction between virtue
and continence is the basis for a substantial debate between virtue ethics and Kantian
deontology. in which there is a
widespread view according to which Aristotle and Kant have a fundamental
disagreement about whether the good person is the one with full virtue (arete).
who does the right thing naturally and enjoys doing it .... or whether he/she 1s
the self-controlled person (enkrateie). who does the right thing in spite of a
desire to do otherwise. Statman. Introduction. supra note 103. at 29.
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In keeping with virtue ethics' focus on the fully virtuous
person as the model for right conduct, it is understandable that
less attention has been focused on the enkratic, or continent,
agent. A continent person, after alL is not, by definition, a fully
virtuous person. In the nonideal world, however, there is every
reason to want to focus on the continent agent, who at least does
the right thing, even if she does so against her own desires. Such
an approach is still aretaic, inasmuch as it is still focused on
questions of character. But it may be more realistic, more "is"centered, in its acceptance of the kinds of human limitations that
form the core of Posner's work. Too lofty a normative vision of
virtue may, in light of the reality of judges as "political agents
making policies and laws, ... put a strain on the notion of the
virtuous judge." 174 We may conclude that if judges cannot be
perfectly virtuous, still, if they can refrain from vice, they may be
"'good enough'" for our purposes.m So, if we are to fuse the real
world of judging with the more normative account of judicial
virtue, we may want to consider the ways in which we can
structure the moves and practices of the judicial game in a way
that, if it cannot guarantee judicial virtue, can at least encourage
judicial continence. In fact, the two are not in opposition to each
other. Just as the fledgling doctor may begin by "enacting" her
professional role "without an accompanying sense of
authenticity or identification," and only acquire the "identity
conferring aspect of [the] professional role[ ]" with time and
176
experience, so the same set of norms and influences that
encourage continence in a judge may over time ripen into a
fuller sense of judicial virtue. To attempt to encourage at least a
minimal sense of judicial continence may thus in the long run
maximize the possibility of judicial virtue.
In short, an aretaic approach to judging might lead us to
think about what set of institutional norms, practices, and
constraints might help constrain judicial vice and nourish judicial
virtue. Solum, for instance, argues that the judicial selection
process should "prioritize the nomination and confirmation of
In keeping with the '"dialectical development" of virtue ethics. id. at 30. Hursthouse and
Philippa Foot have argued that Aristotle and Kant are not as far from each other as the
conventional view would hold. See HURSTHOUSE. supra note 101. at 92-104. These
matters are well beyond the scope of this Essay.
174. Judith N. Shklar. Justice Without Virtue. in VIRTUE: NOMOS XXXIV. supra
note 101. at 283. 286. Shklar·s short but electric essay is required reading. in my view. for
anyone interested in virtue jurisprudence.
175. !d.
176. Radden. supra note 117. at 125.

162

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:97

individuals who possess the judicial virtues," that "'programs of
judicial education should aim to cultivate those virtues in those
who are already judges," and that imperfectly virtuous judges
"should aim to emulate the decisions of excellent judges when
they can and exemplify the virtue of judicial humility" -a point
which we mi~ht recharacterize in terms of continence- "when
77
they cannot."
Beyond these basic recommendations, we might also draw
here on a number of possible constraints offered in the books
under review. Both Posner and Farber and Sherry offer a host of
practical suggestions based on the inglorious determinants of
judicial behavior in the real world. Posner, for example,
emphasizes that the constrained pragmatist judge is "boxed
in ... by norms that require of judges impartiality, awareness of
the importance of the law's being predictable enough to guide
the behavior of those subject to it ... , and a due regard for the
integrity of the written word in contracts and statutes" (Posner
13). Like Solum, he emphasizes the role of the confirmation
process in ''[w]eeding out candidates unwilling to play [the
judicial game] by the rules'' (Posner 90), and he adds that the
rigorous and unpleasant nature of both the confirmation process
and, to a lesser extent, legal training in general may constitute an
external constraint that generates an internal constraint, a
"commitment to the institution" of judging (Posner 127). ~
Similarly, Farber and Sherry argue that both legal education and
legal practice creates "a professional lifetime of acquired
tendencies that discourage unchecked discretion" (Farber &
Sherry 115). and they offer a set of modest reforms to Supreme
Court practice, such as the diversification of cases beyond
controversial constitutional questions and the opening up of the
"cert. pool," to ''try to ensure that service on the Court
reinforces rather than diminishes professionalism" (Farber &
Sherry 119).
Perhaps surprisingly, though, I want to return to Powell,
whose rhapsodic account of the moral dimensions of judging I
have already suggested is too much fixed on the "ought" rather
than the "is." Nevertheless, Powell identifies a central constraint
on judges when he begins his book with a discussion of the
centrality of the judicial oath, which figures so prominently in
17

177. Solum. supra note 11. at 498-99.
178. Cf Pellegrino. supra note 116 (discussing medical training): Radden. supra note
117 (discussing training in psychiatry and medicine).
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Marbury v. Madison. As we have seen, Powell believes that
judicial review as a practice flows not only from the
Constitution, but "from the judge ·s individual obligations as a
moral actor" (Powell 3). He thus sees in the '"oath requirement a
juxtaposition of the judiciary's governmental role and the judge's
personal conscience. one that gives moral weight to the
individual's exercise of the power of judicial review that the
community has entrusted to him'' (Powell 3). For Powell, the
oath thus "bears directly on how the judge carries out his duties
and understands his role in relationship to other governmental
officials'' (Powell3). ~
At the risk of being rhapsodic myself. I think the oath
1
deserves this attention. "" The short but sweeping language of the
federal judicial oath. with its injunction to "administer justice
without respect to persons. and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich," and to "faithfully and impartially discharge all the
duties incumbent upon me ... under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, .,JKI is an apt, if open-ended. description of
and ode to the judicial virtues. As Powell observes, the judicial
2
oath, and the formalities attendant upon swearing it/" ties the
judge's character intimately to his or her office, rendering every
decision in office both one that has official weight and must be
undertaken consistently with the judge's official duties, and one
that has about it a sense of personal moral obligation. Properly
understood and seriously considered, the oath can be a forceful
17

179. See also John McCarthy QC. Conremporary Advocacy: Value-Free?. 38 CATH.
LAW. 25. 35 ( 1998) (arguing that ""the very constitution of our courts."" including the
judicial oath. ""manifests an immediate moral dimension·· that is immanent in the act of
oath-taking itself).
180. Indeed. this Essay is in a sense a preview of broader work I am undertaking on
both the history and meaning(s) of the judicial oath. and of the relationship between
constitutional oaths and constitutional interpretation more generally. For a short essay
focusing on the Presidential oath and constitutional interpretation. see Paul Horwitz.
Honor's Constitlllional Momenr: The Oath and Presidential Transitions. 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1067 (2009).
181. 28 u.s.c. § 453 (2006).
182. Although I focus on the oath here. we might add to our list of important
constraints on judges all the "trappings"" of the judicial role-robes. the bench. and so
on-that. although they may increase the judge's self-regard and thus his tendency to fall
into certain kinds of judicial vice. such as arrogance. also serve to make ··judicial decision
making ... public and formal and therefore more cautious·· (Farber & Sherry at 94).
Chad Oldfather makes the somewhat different point that. ··At least implicitly. we impute
near-magical properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning a black robe. as if they
somehow eliminate one"s susceptibility to all the foibles. biases. and petty jealousies that
are the stuff of day-to-day life ... Oldfather. supra note 26. at 127. That is surely true. but
my reliance on the oath and other solemnities here is not for their magical property to
transform someone into a non-human being. but for the degree to which they may
influence and constrain the actual traits and role identities of judges.
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reminder of what virtuous judging demands. 1H' It can also be a
constraint for the potentially incontinent or imperfectly virtuous
judge.
To be sure, the oath carries with it no realistic fear of
penalty, and perhaps in this sense Posner is right to say that it is
little more than a loyalty oath, and a lightly constraining one at
that (Powell 5). Like the Hippocratic Oath, it is largely an
internal constraint, and one whose ancient status (its language
has barely been altered since the Judiciary Act of 1789) and
open-ended terms do not, at first blush, provide much guidance
for judges. It is, in Oakley and Cocking's words, a regulative
ideal, but not a very precise one. I am too ill-versed in judicial
psychology to know whether judges think very strongly about
the oath either when they take it or long afterwards, and one can
well imagine that judges might either ignore its language or fail
to see any meaningful constraint on them in its terms. But I
think we can say three more meaningful things about the power
of the oath to encourage judicial continence or virtue, two of
them fairly practical in nature and one more exploratory and
speculative.
Practically, it is important to see that there is a potential
connection between the oath and judges' "desire for self-respect
and for respect from other judges and legal professionals
generally," as well as the "intrinsic satisfactions of judging," two
tastes that Posner calls "the biggest internal constraints" on
judges' conduct (Posner 371; see also Posner 60-62, 70). The
taste for both self-respect and the respect of others "requires
conformity to the accepted norms of judging," which, as Posner
recognizes, are captured in the oath itself (Posner 61, 70). Thus,
obedience to the oath, and the vision of judicial virtue it
presents, is ultimately a form of winning self-respect and the
respect of others, and thus maximizing a judge's own satisfaction
in her job. Second, although the oath may be a loose regulative
ideal, it is still a regulative ideal of sorts. As such, it may be
internalized, in a way that either encourages judicial virtue or at
least demands a minimal level of judicial continence. 1>4
183. For similar reflections. which capture in part the moral and jurisprudential
meanings that can be gleaned from a close reading of the judicial oath. see Shirley S.
Abrahamson. Commentary on Jeffrey M. Shaman·s The Impartial Judge: Detachment or
Passion?. 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 633 (1996). For an article suggesting. without offering
much argument. the centrality of the judicial oath to the judicial role. see Diane P. Wood.
Reflections on the Judicial Oath. 8 GREEN BAG 2d 177 (2005).
184. See Oakley & Cocking. supra note 105. at 25 (regulative ideals may be
internalized "in such a way that [agents] are able to adjust their motivation and conduct
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Finally, and more positively, we might begin rethinking the
importance of the oath as part of a broader aretaic turn. We
might, in short, think of "reviving" the centrality of the oath
along with, and as a necessary part of, a broader revival of the
sense of the importance of judicial virtue. This is not so much an
idealistic project as a project whose concern is to recover and
reinforce the background context and conditions in which
judicial virtue might flourish in the real world. To the extent
that, as Posner argues and Powell agrees, judging involves
playing the "judicial game," this project may be seen as an effort
to reinforce those rules of the game that emphasize and
encourage the flourishing of the judicial virtues. The "revival" of
the oath might be one piece, although a symbolically important
and practically constraining one, of that broader project.
Although this is not a purely idealistic project, it is a
substantial one. As some virtue theorists have noted, the aretaic
turn can be seen as "opting ultimately for a different kind of
1
society and for different relationships among its members." ' '
Thus, reviving a sense of the centrality of the judicial oath, as
Powell recommends, or the centrality of a virtue-oriented
account of constitutional law more generally, may ultimately
entail rethinking and reshaping the values that surround the
American constitutional enterprise more broadly, and perhaps
the wider American political nomos. The oath itself, for instance,
1
is broadly tied to questions of personal and political honor; '" and
honor itself is generally taken to be a weak or obsolete virtue
today.w To be sure, we might rely, as we have seen, on the
connection between the oath and the judicial taste for selfrespect and the respect of others. But the oath was once
arguably tied to a thicker sense of honor than that, one which
ran deep in the American political mind. 1" So a revival of the
oath entails a revival of the sense of honor as an important spur
so that it conforms-or at least does not conflict-with that standard'').
185. Statman.lntroduction. supra note 103 at 2.
186. See. e.g .. Horwitz. supra note 180. at 1071-72.
187. See, e.g.. Peter Berger. On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour. II EL:R.
J. Soc. 39 (1970). reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed ..
1984): Wendel. supra note 156. at 1969 (noting the "anachronistic resonance" of the use
of honor and shame as a regulatory mechanism): cf KRO~MAN. supra note 8. at 13 ("The
classical figure of the lawyer-statesman has in my generation become a quaint antique
with little of the power it once possessed to inspire or excite"): id. at 165 (arguing that the
virtue- and character-centered ideals that underlie the ideal of the lawver-statesman "no
longer possess the authority they once did").
·
188. See generally JOANNE B. FREEMAN. AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIO~AL POLITICS
I~ THE NEW REPUBLIC (200 I).
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toward virtuous conduct and constraint against vicious
1
conduct. '"
We might, to be sure, find some support for this project in
history, and judicial history in particular. Philip Hamburger has
written recently in strong terms about the constraining force of
judicial duty, a concept with deep roots in Anglo-American
judicial history and one that is intimately tied to the obligations
of the judicial oath. 1Yo But Hamburger may have romanticized
somewhat his account of judicial duty: 1y 1 and in any event, we
have plainly moved a long way from any simple reliance on
judicial duty or the oath, and an appeal to history will not change
that any more than a visit to Colonial Williamsburg will turn us
all into the Founding Fathers. 1" 2
CONCLUSION
This may seem a somewhat romantic note on which to close
this Essay. It is not meant to be. In its fullest form, the aretaic
turn may indeed involve the kind of imaginative reconstruction
of the norms and values of the judicial enterprise that I have
described. It may be that the judicial virtues cannot flourish
without planting new soil in which they can grow.
But, as I have argued, we can see ways in which even the
"hard-bitten realism" that Powell laments in Posner's vision of
the judicial role provides some spaces in which an aretaic
account of judging might take root. Indeed, it may be that we
cannot attain Powell's broader goals without beginning with
hard-bitten realism. 1y 3 It may be that working within the spaces
189. I should note that Aristotle himself did not count honor as a virtue. although he
saw it as ··the greatest of external goods:· and one that a proud man is justly concerned
with as ··the prize of virtue." albeit one that he should only receive to the extent of his
deserts. Aristotle. supra note 141. at 1123b-1124a.
190. PHILIP HA\1BCRGER. LAW AND JUDICIAL DCTY (2008).
191. Or so l argue in a review of his book in 10 ENGAGE: THE JOURNAL OF THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY'S PRACTICE GROCPS 131 (2009). http://www.fed-soc.org/
doclib/20090720_Engage 102.pdf.
192. See KRO:-.IMAN. supra note 8. at 13-14:
(The lawyer-statesman ideal cannot be revived] merely by repeating what others
have said about the ideal in the past. For it is just this-the traditional portrait
of the lawyer-statesman-that has lost its power to inspire .... To regain some
sense of its appeal. therefore. we must reconstruct the ideal of the lawyerstatesman from the bottom up .... (O]nly philosophy can breathe life back into
an ideal when the tradition that sustained it dies away. The recovery of every
lost ideal is in that sense a philosophical project. and the model of the lawyerstatesman is no exception.
193. Cf. Annas. supra note 77 ("(A]n ethical theory is weakened if the best
contempor-ary science conflicts with its claims or makes it hard to see how they could be
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that Posner provides may. in the long run, best satisfy Powell's
desires without slighting Posner's realism, and might be more
realistic and less abstract than Farber and Sherry's own attempt
to bridge the gap between the extremes. Within the crucial
internal constraint of the judicial taste for respect and selfrespect, we can see ways in which both judicial continence and
the judicial virtues might be encouraged. Within the judicial
oath, we can see the seeds of a regulative ideal that might
inform, constrain, and even inspire judges to virtue, or at least
steer them toward continence and away from vice. It may be that
once we have taken the aretaic turn, our thoughts will inevitably
bend towards a broader imaginative reconstruction of the
judicial role in accordance with judicial excellence. For the time
being, however, it is enough to observe that an account of
judging, constitutional and otherwise, that places judicial
character at its center may be the best way to rethink the judicial
role in a way that both takes the realities of the judicial "is" into
account and tries to find new language, or revive old language, in
a way that moves us toward a worthier. but still attainable,
judicial "ought. " 1y4

true.""): Oldfather. supra note 26. at 145 (""Only by first locating the potential weak points
in the judicial psyche can we hope to create institutions and develop mechanisms that
serve as prophylactics against any resulting undesired consequences."").
194. Cf Fallon, supra note 13. at 977-79 (arguing that constitutional scholars have
been too focused on normative theories and too inattentive to practical constraints on
constitutional judging. while political scientists have been more focused on constraints
but insufficiently aware of ""the ways in which legal norms may shape officials' goals and
thereby constrain their behavior. .. and proposing that we ""open up the subject of
constitutional constraints as a topic for inquiry in American constitutional theory"").

